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6Preface: The Usalama Project
The eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) has been mired 
in violence for two decades and continues to be plagued by dozens of 
armed groups. Yet, these groups—and how they interact with their 
social and political environment—remain poorly understood. The Rift 
Valley Institute’s Usalama Project (Usalama means ‘safety’ or ‘security’ 
in Swahili) is a field-based, partner-driven research initiative that aims 
to examine armed groups and their influence on Congolese society. 
While the first phase of the Usalama Project (2012–2013) focused on 
understanding armed groups, the second phase (2015–2016) investigates 
governance in conflict. It is guided by a series of questions: How do 
armed actors affect conflicts related to public authority? How, in turn, 
do local authorities shape patterns of armed group organization? And 
what are the effects of armed group presence on governance and service 
provision? The research also examines government policies and external 
interventions aimed at reducing armed group activity and improving the 
quality of local governance and conflict resolution.
The project takes a primarily qualitative approach, drawing on exten-
sive fieldwork by both international and Congolese researchers. It traces 
the trajectories of armed groups and analyses the contexts in which they 
operate by means of interviews with a wide range of actors—including 
local authorities, representatives of civil society, small and large-scale 
business interests and members of armed groups. It also draws upon 
available historical and administrative sources, reports and scholarly 
work by Congolese and international researchers and organizations. 
The Governance in Conflict phase of the Usalama Project is part of the 
Political Settlements Research Programme (PSRP), led by the University 
of Edinburgh’s Global Justice Academy and funded by the UK Depart-
ment for International Development (DFID). 
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Summary 
The long-term presence of armed groups in the eastern Congo, which 
dates back to the mid-1990s and in some areas even before this, has 
turned these groups into an integral part of local political settlements. 
The resulting instability in the east has not precluded a relatively stable 
political settlement from emerging at the level of the Congo as a whole: 
The incumbent president, Joseph Kabila, has been in power on an 
uninterrupted basis since 2001.
This report examines the relations between the stability of the national 
political settlement and instability in the east, analysing the historical 
evolution and features of political settlements at both levels. In order to 
understand the current policies of the national government—dominated 
by the presidential patronage network—towards armed group activity 
in the east, it is necessary to identify the political, socio-economic and 
military-strategic stakes that this activity presents to the incumbent 
president and his wider networks. 
Following historical patterns that originate in the colonial era, the 
presidential patronage network concentrates its efforts to exercise direct 
control on areas of vital political and economic importance, which are 
primarily the capital city and industrial extractive enclaves in the former 
province of Katanga. Consequently, it has limited incentives to address 
small-scale armed groups located in isolated rural areas in the east, 
especially when they lack military strength and geopolitical significance. 
Moreover, ongoing violent conflict provides indirect benefits in the form 
of patronage resources, including those generated via military operations 
and influxes of international aid. 
Due to the profound fragmentation of the military landscape and 
reduced foreign interference in recent years, the vast majority of the 
dozens of non-state armed forces currently operating in the east are 
smaller-sized groups. This is both a cause and an outcome of the dimin-
ishing significance of armed groups in the national political arena. During 
the transitional period (2003–2006) that followed the Second Congo 
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War, when the ex-belligerents committed to a power-sharing agreement, 
manipulating armed groups remained a valued political currency. It often 
allowed for pushing through political claims and gave access to important 
positions in the political-administrative apparatus and the security forces. 
In the post-transitional political settlement, by contrast, leveraging 
armed groups has yielded decreasing benefits in national politics. Until 
recently, however, harnessing armed mobilization did continue to give 
access to ranks and positions in the national armed forces. One reason 
for the decreasing political value of armed mobilization at the national 
level is that the presidential patronage network has reinforced its grip 
on the state apparatus and society. It has done so through a mixture of 
co-optation, coercion and international support, and as a consequence, 
it is better able to address armed and other challenges to its authority. 
The result is rising authoritarian tendencies and a less inclusive political 
settlement, as reflected in growing restrictions on and harassment of 
political actors deemed dangerous, including but not limited to members 
of the political opposition. 
The more exclusive and repressive nature of the national political 
settlement has affected armed mobilization in the east. Armed groups are 
embedded in complex social networks that stretch from the very local to 
the national, sub-regional and international levels, and that encompass 
both state and non-state actors. These groups maintain ties of a varying 
nature to politicians, businesspeople, local authorities and government 
security forces, sometimes operating as proxies or allies in military 
operations. Many of these relations can be characterized as protection 
mechanisms, with both coercive and non-coercive dimensions. On 
the one hand, armed groups impose contributions on populations and 
economic operators in the framework of protection rackets, but also as 
part of wider governance mechanisms and claims to authority. On the 
other hand, people may solicit protection and other interventions from 
these groups at their own initiative, such as to reinforce their position 
in a conflict or to protect their merchandise in unsafe areas. When it 
concerns local authorities, protection from armed groups is also sought 
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to enforce administrative decisions and obtain the upper hand in power 
struggles. 
Malfunctioning civilian governance mechanisms and weak state 
security provision drive the demand for protection from armed groups. 
This demand also stems from the fact that when not soliciting protection, 
people are in a less favourable position compared to those competi-
tors and opponents who do have powerful protectors. Additionally, 
protection mechanisms have, to a certain extent, become a normal 
practice that is applied by relatively large segments of the political and 
economic establishment in the east. Evidence for this normalization is 
that armed groups are increasingly led by lower-level political-military 
entrepreneurs—customary chiefs, local authorities and second-tier army 
commanders—and not, as in the past, primarily by national and regional 
elites. 
The lower-level political-military entrepreneurs sustaining armed 
mobilization are in part inspired by discontent with the current political 
settlement, both in relation to their own position within that settlement 
and the nature of the social-political order as a whole. Many armed groups 
do voice anti-establishment views even while lacking comprehensive 
political visions and objectives. Hence, contrary to popular portrayals 
of armed groups as purely criminal, armed mobilization continues to 
have a clear political dimension. This also explains why some armed 
groups draw a relatively high level of popular support: People are fed 
up with the current regime and endorse the idea of self-defence due to 
the deficiencies of the state apparatus, especially in a context of intense 
communal conflict. 
The fact that armed mobilization has a political dimension does not 
necessarily imply that armed groups should be treated as legitimate 
political actors. These groups cannot simply be taken as representatives 
of the communities they claim to defend. Many of their political demands 
are difficult to meet because they are discriminatory in nature. Other 
demands relate to access to the state apparatus, such as high administra-
tive positions, and improved public service provision, for instance roads 
and health care centres. Responding to such demands risks creating 
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incentives for others to emulate and initiate armed mobilization to claim 
similar benefits. 
In this vein, many past government policies to tackle armed groups—
notably army integration—have had counterproductive effects, as they 
created skewed incentive structures. Any efforts to address political-
military entrepreneurs should avoid repeating this and instead seek to 
apply carrots and sticks in equal measure. It is also necessary to find the 
right equilibrium between addressing the structural dynamics that feed 
into armed mobilization and dealing with currently active armed groups. 
This dilemma of a long-term versus a short-term orientation also applies 
to the question of inclusion. In order to promote sustainable stabilization 
in the eastern Congo, it will be necessary to empower peaceful civilian 
actors and include them in decision-making processes in order to reach a 
more inclusive political settlement at the national level. Achieving these 
long-term objectives will prove a challenge in the current situation of 
stable instability.
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1. Introduction
After more than two decades of ongoing violent conflict, armed groups—
however fleeting their existence—have become an integral feature of the 
eastern Congo’s social-political order. They are not a temporary aberra-
tion in what is otherwise a normal society. They are at the heart of the 
way power is exercised and experienced. Moreover, armed groups do not 
stand apart from either society or the state apparatus. They are deeply 
embedded in social networks that regroup state and non-state actors 
and that stretch from the very local to the national and sometimes the 
sub-regional (Great Lakes area) and international levels. 
Grasping this complexity requires a break from a binary approach to 
understanding political order, in particular the dichotomies between 
state versus non-state spheres and civilian versus military agents. 
Militarized networks in the eastern Congo straddle these categories. For 
example, officers of government security forces and local administrators 
may have ties to armed groups: Politicians too can initiate and direct 
armed movements. 
While of crucial importance in the east, at the national level, armed 
groups play a highly varied role in the power strategies of individual 
politicians and their wider political networks. Key figures in the political 
establishment have few dealings with such groups. Nevertheless, the 
power configuration encapsulated by these national networks, and which 
constitutes the political settlement, shapes armed group activity in the 
east in important ways, including via formal and informal policies to deal 
with these groups. 
The notion of political settlement is used by a growing number 
of practitioners, policymakers and academics as a lens to analyse 
power structures and dynamics within societies, and to inform policy 
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interventions.1 In this report, the term ‘political settlement’ is seen to 
relate to how power is configured within a social-political order that 
is: How access to resources that generate power (political, military, 
economic and ideological)2 is distributed between and among dominant 
actors and those being dominated, and how this distribution is perceived 
and legitimated.
The application of political settlement theory focuses on three broad 
areas: Stability, inclusivity and the extent to which changes in the 
political settlement are violent. The stability of political settlements 
depends on whether (aspiring) elites—and to a lesser extent, those being 
dominated—consider the current settlement to serve their interests and 
to conform to their worldviews and beliefs. Stability also depends on 
the possibilities for and efforts of aspirants to insert themselves among 
the dominant actors. How non-elites perceive a particular settlement 
depends in part on its inclusivity, or to what extent those who are other 
than elite actors are able to shape arrangements of power and governance. 
Where non-elite actors can exercise a measure of influence, the chances 
are higher that a settlement will remain stable in the long term. What is 
also important for stability is how political settlements transform, and 
notably, to what degree changes to them involve violence. This, again, 
is related to both the opportunities for the exercise of violence and the 
extent to which employing violence is seen as legitimate. 
Thinking in terms of political settlements provides insights into the 
incentives of political actors, or what motivates their decisions and 
practices. This helps to understand when and why they support armed 
groups or resort to violence, or by contrast, strive towards reducing these 
1 Christine Bell, ‘What we talk about when we talk about political settlements. 
Towards inclusive and open political settlements in an era of disillusion’, PSRP Working 
Paper 1, Edinburgh: Global Justice Academy, University of Edinburgh, September 2015. 
For a critical analysis of the concept of political settlements, see: Kasper Hoffmann and 
Tom Kirk, ‘Public authority and the provision of public goods in conflict-affected and 
transitioning regions’, JSRP Working Paper 7, London School of Economics, August 2013. 
2 See: Michael Mann, The Sources of Social Power: Volume 1, A History of Power from the 
Beginning to AD 1760, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986. 
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threats. Moreover, looking at how non-elite actors relate to armed groups, 
and how this relationship is shaped by the political settlement, fosters a 
better understanding of the links between stability and inclusivity, and 
therefore of the drivers of armed mobilization. In sum, political settle-
ments analysis, in particular when focused on the role of armed groups, 
is important for developing policies aimed at stabilization, especially in 
relation to reducing armed group activity and violence. 
This report analyses the stability, inclusivity and levels of violence of 
both the political settlement of the Congo as a whole and of political 
settlements in the conflict-ridden east. It shows that in each of these 
political arenas, armed groups and violence play a different role, and 
examines how these arenas mutually influence each other. The relative 
importance of armed groups as either resources or threats to the power 
of the presidential patronage network shapes its policies towards the 
east, such as initiatives for military operations or negotiations. These 
policies influence the role that armed groups play locally. This role, in 
turn, shapes to what extent and how national politicians engage with 
armed groups; for instance, whether they support their mobilization or 
demobilization. 
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2. The historical evolution of the 
Congo’s political settlement 
Understanding how power in the Congo is distributed and exercised 
is a challenging task, not least due to the number and heterogeneity 
of the political actors involved. The Congo counts hundreds of ethnic 
groups and languages, is composed of zones with distinct political-
economic structures and regional orientations, has a vast number of 
political parties, and more importantly, contains numerous competing 
power networks. The military landscape in the eastern Congo is equally 
fragmented and diverse. At present, there are more than 70 armed groups 
operating in the Kivu provinces alone, and their numbers change from 
day to day.3 Paradoxically, the resulting instability in the east goes hand 
in hand with relative stability at the national level. One reason for this is 
that the national elites’ power base does not critically depend on formal 
control over the east. Rather, they derive most of their income and influ-
ence from other parts of the country. This uneven control, which is 
directly related to levels of state penetration, originates in the colonial 
era, and has continued to shape the Congo’s political settlement from 
independence onwards.4 
From instability to stability and back (1960–1996)
The Congo’s independence in 1960 starkly exposed the difficulties of 
forging a stable political settlement in a social-political order charac-
terized by a multitude of heterogeneous interests linked to diverging 
agendas, visions and international partners. Between 1960–1967, the 
3 Jason Stearns and Christoph Vogel, ‘The landscape of armed groups in the eastern 
Congo’, New York: Congo Research Group, Center on International Cooperation, 
December 2015.
4 Bogumil Jewswiecki, ‘Zaire enters the world system: its colonial incorporation as the 
Belgian Congo, 1885–1960’, in Zaire: The Political Economy of Underdevelopment, ed. Guy Gran, 
New York: Praeger, 1979.
 ThE EVOLUTION OF ThE CONGO’S POLITICAL SETTLEMENT 15
country was faced with assassinations of key leaders, secession attempts, 
large-scale insurgencies and a coup d’état. This upheaval was partly driven 
by competition between social-political networks rooted in different 
regions of the country, often emerging from the first political parties that 
were formed on an ethno-regional basis before independence.5 
The violent power struggles that marked the Congo’s first years of 
independence gradually tapered off after a bloodless coup d’état in 1965. 
The man who seized power, Joseph-Désiré Mobutu—together with his 
inner circle and wider networks—fostered a political settlement that 
remained relatively stable for decades. Once he had built up a power base 
in the Congolese armed forces, of which he was also the chief of staff, 
and rallied crucial international support, Mobutu managed to consolidate 
his authority, in part via the recentralization of state power. To that end, 
he heavily invested in the expansion and centralization of the territorial 
administration and developed a firm grip on the state security services. 
He also created a political party, the Mouvement populaire de la révolution 
(MPR, Popular Movement of the Revolution), membership of which 
was obligatory for all citizens, and embarked upon a vast socialization 
programme in order to legitimize his rule.6
In continuity with the colonial era, state penetration remained highly 
uneven. State agencies and administrative, transport and communica-
tions infrastructure were clustered around core political and economic 
areas. These included the capital city, import–export routes and the 
industrial mining sector in the southern province of Katanga. This last 
sector was the Congo’s economic powerhouse, yielding the largest 
share of the country’s gross domestic product (GDP), tax revenues and 
foreign exchange; however, it stood in relative isolation from the rest 
of the economy. Industrial mining was heavily dependent on foreign 
investment and strongly oriented towards external markets. Growth in 
5 Crawford Young, Politics in Congo. Decolonization and Independence, Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1965.
6 Thomas Callaghy, The State-Society Struggle: Zaire in Comparative Perspective, New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1984.
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this sector did not necessarily yield benefits for the rural economy of 
small-scale agricultural production, which remained crucial for most 
Congolese’s livelihood.7 
The main benefit from the industrial mining sector accrued to the 
elites who formed part of the presidential patronage network. The latter 
dominated the government, the administration and the security services. 
These elites made use of their position in the state apparatus to generate 
resources for patronage and to engage in revenue-generating activities for 
their personal gain. Patronage and personalized networks increasingly 
influenced how the state worked, intersecting with formal bureaucratic 
hierarchies.8 
In order to maintain a grip on the state apparatus, the presidential 
patronage network made appointments on the basis of loyalty rather 
than merit; frequently rotated office holders to prevent clients’ estab-
lishing autonomous power bases (in extreme cases, through purges); 
encouraged their dependence by granting and withholding access to 
revenue-generating opportunities, including the private appropriation of 
public resources; and finally, created parallel institutions and agencies to 
further divide and rule.9 
The result of Mobutu’s personalization of rule was an ever narrowing 
power base concentrated around people who originated from his home 
region in Equateur Province. This development intensified from the 
early 1970s onwards as the economy contracted: The twin result of the 
world economic crisis in 1973 and a series of ill-conceived measures 
to expropriate foreign business owners and redistribute their assets 
among the dominant political-commercial class.10 As patronage resources 
7 Guy Gran, ‘An introduction to Zaire’s permanent development crisis’ and Ghifem 
J. Katwala, ‘Export-led growth: the copper sector’, in Zaire: The Political Economy of 
Underdevelopment, ed. Guy Gran, New York: Praeger, 1979.
8 Crawford Young and Thomas Turner, The Rise and Decline of the Zairian State, Madison: 
University of Wisconsin Press, 1985.
9 Jean-François Bayart, L’État en Afrique. La politique du ventre, 2nd edition, Paris: Fayard, 
2006 [1989]. 
10 Young and Turner, Rise and Decline. 
 ThE EVOLUTION OF ThE CONGO’S POLITICAL SETTLEMENT 17
dwindled, the presidential power circle became increasingly difficult to 
penetrate. While the immediate post-independence period saw some 
social mobility—albeit heavily circumscribed—the political settlement 
now became increasingly exclusive.11 The impact of political exclusion 
was not immediate, however, it did sow the seeds for future instability.
As resource flows from the top dried up, the control of the presidential 
patronage network over lower echelons of the state apparatus weakened. 
Here the result was the emergence of decentralized nodes of power and 
accumulation, which did not directly depend on the closed networks of 
presidential patronage.12 A key development underlying these changes 
was the intensification of economic activities that thrived on the evasion 
or violation of official rules and regulations. Such economic activities 
were therefore commonly described as informal. These non-official activ-
ities became increasingly important for the survival and social mobility 
strategies of elites and non-elites alike. 
State agents played a crucial role in the informal economy, which made 
heavy use of the official economy’s resources, assets, labour, knowledge, 
information and infrastructure. For instance, informal import–export 
trade depended heavily on customs officials, who could declare goods 
for less than their actual value, issue false papers and carry out selec-
tive inspections of loads. At the same time, official economic activities 
became increasingly dependent on non-official practices in order to 
obtain access to foreign exchange or scarce transport possibilities. Hence, 
as with the present day, the informal economy straddled the state and 
non-state spheres.13
The growing implication of state agents in the non-official sphere was 
tolerated by the political centre. Aware of the decreasing resources on 
11 Michael Schatzberg, Politics and Class in Zaire. Bureaucracy, Beer and Business in Lisala, 
New York and London: Africana, 1980. 
12 William Reno, Warlord Politics and African States, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1998.
13 Janet MacGaffey, ‘Historical, cultural and structural dimensions of Zaire’s 
unrecorded trade’, in The Real Economy of Zaire. The Contribution of Smuggling and Other 
Unofficial Activities to National Wealth, ed. Janet MacGaffey, London: James Currey and 
Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1991.
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offer, Mobutu encouraged civil servants and other state agents to fend for 
themselves (se débrouiller), through extortion and other abuses of power. 
As a consequence, state agents engaged in increasingly predatory behav-
iour, turning the state into a key source of socio-economic insecurity 
for citizens. Moreover, in tandem with decreasing control and resources 
from the centre, the growing orientation towards revenue generation 
fostered a decline in the administrative and regulatory capacity of the 
state apparatus, particularly in relation to policy enforcement.14
The state security services saw a similar decline in their already 
limited operational effectiveness. This especially applied to the army, 
which played an important role in maintaining domestic order. Haunted 
by the spectre of a military coup, Mobutu prioritized loyalty over compe-
tence, and granted key figures in the military establishment access to a 
wide range of revenue-generating opportunities, which had the added 
advantage of keeping them out of politics.15 Such opportunities included 
accumulating resources extracted from citizens, embezzling soldiers’ 
salaries and other funds, and making money in the informal economy by 
protecting illegal activities. Since they were deployed in core economic 
areas (for example, border posts, transport hubs) and were able to use 
their coercive abilities and political connections, officers of the national 
armed forces often entered into partnerships with civilian business-
people, becoming involved in activities such as import–export trade, 
smuggling and transport.16 Army commanders also interfered with the 
civilian administration in their area of deployment or origin, partly to 
maximize revenue generation, with some turning into ‘petty tyrants’ or 
‘local warlords’.17 
As with other parts of the state apparatus, the involvement of the 
military in extortion intensified as the official economy further contracted, 
14 Michael Schatzberg, The Dialectics of Oppression in Zaire, Bloomington and 
Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1988; Callaghy, State-Society Struggle.
15 Young and Turner, Rise and Decline.
16 Bayart, L’Etat en Afrique; Reno, Warlord Politics.
17 Schatzberg, Dialectics of Oppression, 57.
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and state and patronage resources became increasingly scarce. At the 
end of the 1980s, it was estimated that soldiers derived no less than 90 
per cent of their income from sources other than their salary.18 In the 
course of the 1990s, the payment of military salaries became increas-
ingly irregular, pushing the military to the verge of disintegration. This 
facilitated the emergence of independent centres of coercive power in 
the form of both urban-based and rural militias. At the same time, due 
to rising insecurity that was in part created by the military itself, the 
demand among businesspeople grew for private protection arrangements 
with the army.19 
In 1990, Mobutu announced a transition to multi-party democracy, a 
promise that was never kept. The prospect of widening political space did, 
however, foster political competition and raised its stakes. This growing 
competition was reflected in and stimulated the increasing use of force, 
in particular in the east, where during this period, long-standing conflicts 
around territory, local authority and identity intensified. Force was also 
increasingly mobilized by political actors for furthering personal political 
and economic interests. A good example of this kind of political-military 
entrepreneur was the Nande politician Enoch Muvingi Nyamwisi who in 
the north of North Kivu liaised with militias, notably the Kasindiens and 
the Bangilima, to reinforce his position. Muvingi also became a broker 
between Mobutu and the Ugandan rebels of the National Army for the 
Liberation of Uganda (NALU) based in the Ruwenzori mountains.20 
In 1992 and 1993, thousands of Kasaians were violently expelled and 
numerous killed by youth militias in Katanga Province.21 Shortly after-
18 Peter Rosenblum, ‘Constructing the authoritarian state: Zaire’, Third World Legal 
Studies 9 (1990).
19 Timothy Raeymaekers, Violent Capitalism and Hybrid Identity in the Eastern Congo. Power 
to the Margins. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014.
20 Stanislas Bucyalimwe Mararo, ‘Le nord-kivu au cœur de la crise congolaise’, in 
L’Afrique des Grands Lacs, Annuaire 2001–2002, eds. Stefaan Marysse and Filip Reyntjens, 
Paris: Karthala, 2003. 
21 Donatien Dibwe dia Mwembu, ‘L’épuration ethnique au Katanga et l’éthique du 
redressement des torts du passé’, Canadian Journal of African Studies/La Revue canadienne des 
études africaines, 33/2–3 (1999).
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wards, large-scale violence broke out in Walikale (North Kivu) involving 
militias mobilized with the support of local authorities and politicians. 
This violence rapidly spread to other parts of the province, causing large-
scale upheaval.22
While the presidential guard eventually managed to restore security 
in North Kivu, events in the wider Great Lakes Region, particularly the 
genocide in Rwanda, would soon generate new waves of instability that 
the security services could not or were no longer willing to address. In 
1996, the insurgency of the Alliance des forces démocratiques pour la libéra-
tion du Congo–Zaïre (AFDL, Allied Democratic Forces for the Liberation 
of Congo–Zaire), backed by a coalition of regional powers, managed to 
topple the Mobutu regime in only seven months. 
The rise of political-military entrepreneurs (1996–2006) 
The AFDL rebellion, which sparked the First Congo War (1996–1997), 
led to a complete overhaul of the Congo’s post-independence political 
settlement (shaped by the Mobutu regime). Importantly, it established a 
regime where Swahiliphones (Swahili-speaking people) from the east, in 
particular from Katanga and the Kivu provinces, held important positions, 
to the disadvantage of the Lingalaphones (Lingala-speaking people), from 
mostly the north-west, who had dominated under Mobutu’s rule. The 
AFDL takeover also opened the door to far-reaching foreign influence, in 
particular of Rwanda and to a lesser extent Uganda, which had provided 
crucial support to the AFDL. Efforts by the Congo’s new president, 
Laurent-Désiré Kabila, to diminish this influence eventually prompted 
Rwanda and Uganda to create and support a new rebellion. In August 
1998, the Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie (RCD, Congolese Rally 
for Democracy) launched its first attack, setting off the Second Congo 
War (1998–2003). 
22 Stanislas Bucyalimwe Mararo, ‘Land, power and ethnic conflict in Masisi (Congo–
Kinshasa), 1940s–1994’, International Journal of African Historical Studies 30/3 (1997); Jason 
Stearns, ‘North Kivu: The Background to Conflict in North Kivu Province of Eastern 
Congo’, Usalama Project, London: Rift Valley Institute, 2013.
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The Second Congo War heralded a profound militarization of the 
Congo’s political settlement. Power was largely exercised through multi-
layered political-military networks that regrouped government and 
rebel actors from countries in the region and domestic political-military 
movements striving to take control over the country. These actors were in 
turn linked to myriad small-scale militias resisting or allying with these 
external and national security forces, while also fighting for more local-
ized spheres of influence and agendas, often linked to conflicts around 
identity, territory and local authority.23 The resulting militarized power 
complexes fuelled and fed off an economy that was primarily shaped by 
coercion-driven activities, including the military occupation and control 
of production sites, border posts and airstrips; forced monopolies, 
imposed taxation and coercive price-fixing; and plunder, looting and 
asset-stripping.24
These militarized political and economic activities, which took various 
forms and involved different levels of violence, built upon existing 
networks and social practices, taking their cue from the military-led 
revenue generating activities and militia politics that had developed 
under Mobutu’s rule in the 1990s. However, political-military entrepre-
neurs now gained more prominence than ever before.25 In the east’s rural 
areas, commanders of Mai-Mai militias—an umbrella term for armed 
groups employing discourses of self-defence and native belonging—
strongly influenced the governance practices of customary chiefs and 
other local authorities. Similarly, in RCD-held areas, its military units 
exercised strong control over the administrative apparatus, to the detri-
ment of the group’s political wing. At the same time, army officers from 
regional powers played important roles in economic activities, as well 
23 Koen Vlassenroot, ‘Reading the Congolese crisis’, in Conflict and Social Transformation 
in Eastern DR Congo, eds. Koen Vlassenroot and Timothy Raeymaekers, Ghent: Conflict 
Research Group and Academia Press, 2004.
24 United Nations, Security Council, ‘Final Report of the Panel of Experts on the 
Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo’, 16 October 2002, S/2002/1146.
25 Vlassenroot, ‘Reading the Congolese crisis’. 
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as in maintaining economic and political control. These patterns were 
reproduced in areas held by other rebel movements, where domestic and 
regional military actors similarly became important players in politics 
and the economy, often to the detriment of local civilian authorities.26
Through the power-sharing arrangements that formed the basis of 
a peace accord adopted in 2003, most of the political-military factions 
involved in the Second Congo War agreed to divide up positions in the 
political and administrative institutions, including the government, the 
parliament and parastatal companies. They also eventually agreed to 
disband their military wings and integrate these into a new national 
army, the Forces armées de la République démocratique du Congo (FARDC, 
Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo), under a mixed 
command chain. Hence, during the transitional period that followed 
the adoption of the peace accord, a new political settlement emerged 
based on a delicate balancing act between different factions and interests. 
The peace accord was signed by the government and no less than five 
belligerent factions, one of which, the Mai-Mai entity, was an imperfect 
amalgamation of dozens of distinct and heterogeneous groups. Other 
signatories included ‘civil society’, comprising an equally disparate mix 
of groups, and what was called the ‘non-armed opposition’, comprised of 
28 different political parties. These entities had relatively limited influ-
ence, reflecting how the balance of power had shifted towards factions 
with military power, most of which transformed into political parties at 
the start of the transition.27 
Since influence at the negotiation table—and later in the transitional 
government—was in part a function of military strength, and because 
using or threatening violence proved a valuable political asset, the 
26 Olivier Lanotte, République démocratique du Congo. Guerres sans frontiers. De Joseph-Désiré 
Mobutu à Joseph Kabila. Brussels: GRIP, Éditions Complexe, 2003.
27 Jean Claude Willame, Les ‘Faiseurs de Paix’ au Congo. Gestion d’une crise internationale dans 
un État sous tutelle, Brussels: GRIP, Éditions Complexe, 2007.
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transition entrenched the political instrumentalization of violence.28 
This was especially visible in the military integration process, which 
unfolded in an irregular manner. Many of the belligerent factions were 
embedded in local and regional political-economic networks that did not 
depend on the political centre, and which were hesitant to give up their 
autonomous sources of income and influence.29 Some leaders refused to 
integrate their troops into the army and kept hidden arms caches. Others 
did integrate but manipulated their integration, attempting to maintain 
separate chains of command and un-integrated units in the army. Such 
tactics were particularly applied in the east, which had seen the most 
profound and fragmented militarization during the wars.30
Those who initially refused military integration were offered another 
opportunity to integrate at a later stage, often being promised higher 
ranks and positions than before. This policy created incentives for 
military leaders to refuse integration or desert, as it allowed them to up 
the stakes in subsequent rounds of negotiations. When new negotiations 
did not yield the desired results, they would frequently withdraw from 
the process to create more mayhem and demand further concessions 
in future integration processes. Where this strategy was successfully 
applied, reintegrated military leaders set a precedent, showing how 
violence is rewarded with high ranks and positions, which resulted in 
the proliferation of armed groups.31 
Both armed groups, and the semi-autonomous networks in the army 
that developed during the transition, liaised with local political leaders, 
28 International Crisis Group, ‘The Congo’s Transition is Failing: Crisis in the Kivus’, 
Report 91/Africa, 30 March 2005; Denis Tull and Andreas Mehler, ‘The hidden costs of 
power-sharing: reproducing insurgent violence in Africa’, African Affairs 104/416 (2005). 
29 Koen Vlassenroot and Timothy Raeymaekers, ‘New political order in the DR Congo? 
The transformation of regulation’, Afrika Focus 21/2 (2008).
30 Judith Verweijen, ‘Half-brewed: the lukewarm results of creating an integrated 
Congolese military’, in New Armies from Old. Merging Competing Military Forces after Civil 
Wars, ed. Roy Licklider, Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2014.
31 Maria Eriksson Baaz and Judith Verweijen, ‘The volatility of a half-cooked 
bouillabaisse. Rebel–military integration and conflict dynamics in eastern DRC’, African 
Affairs 112/449 (2013). 
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authorities and businesspeople. These links were a result of, and further 
fuelled, the ongoing militarization of political and economic competi-
tion, conflict regulation and local governance. (Aspiring) politicians, 
businesspeople, customary chiefs and local administrators all drew on 
armed groups or allied parallel networks in the army to wield influence, 
obtain resources and disadvantage or harm opponents and competitors. 
The resulting widespread use of force reinforced the existing distrust, not 
only among ex-belligerents and opposed communities, but also towards 
the state apparatus, and the security services in particular. 
Many of the former belligerent factions and their associated civilian 
networks believed that positions in the FARDC command chain had 
not been evenly distributed, causing certain factions to dominate. For 
discontented factions and communities, the FARDC’s perceived lack 
of neutrality justified maintaining ties to armed groups as a form of 
self-defence, a trend reinforced by political-military entrepreneurs, who 
drew on ethnic rhetoric or other conflict narratives to force their power 
and popularity. Local security dilemmas ensued: Opposing communi-
ties each believed they needed armed force at their disposal to avoid 
becoming victim of the other.32 By tolerating and endorsing armed 
groups, however, insecurity only grew, not least as many groups preyed 
on the very communities they claimed to protect.
The emergence of a formal political unsettlement 
(2003–2006)
The political settlement that was forged during the transition was relatively 
inclusive, as a large number of different groups and factions gained formal 
access to the state apparatus and the political arena. Intense competition 
for power, however, was undiminished. In fact, the competition and 
32 Maria Eriksson Baaz and Judith Verweijen, ‘Between Integration and Disintegration. 
The Erratic Trajectory of the Congolese Army’, paper prepared for The DR Congo Affinity 
Group, Social Science Research Council, 2013; see also: Christoph Vogel, ‘Contested 
statehood, security dilemmas and militia politics: the rise and transformation of the Raia 
Mutomboki in eastern DRC’, in L’Afrique des Grands Lacs. Annuaire 2013–2014, eds. Filip 
Reyntjens, Stefaan Vandeginste and Marijke Verpoorten, Paris: L’ Harmattan, 2014.
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conflicts that had fuelled both Congo wars continued but were no longer 
primarily fought out on the battlefield. Rebel movements transformed 
into political parties and tried to gain influence and stake out claims 
both through the central state apparatus, including the armed forces, 
and outside of it, by creating or liaising with armed groups. Additionally, 
many ex-belligerent factions were not cohesive, which fostered internal 
competition and splits. The transition introduced what has been termed 
a ‘formal political unsettlement’, involving the creation of a set of formal 
political institutions that became the theatre for ongoing conflict and 
bargaining over control of and access to the state.33 
The conflicts and competition fuelled by this political unsettlement 
were tackled on unequal footing. The factions that could muster the most 
military strength had a privileged position at the negotiating table and 
were allocated more powerful positions. This invited the belligerents 
to demonstrate their capacity to use force, hoping that this would earn 
them a larger share of the national cake. Consequently, the substantial 
degree of inclusivity in the political settlement—at least among elite and 
military factions— went hand in hand with further violence. 
Criteria other than the mobilization of violence, however, also deter-
mined which factions dominated in the new political settlement. In order 
to be influential, groups also needed political and economic capital, 
including connections in higher echelons of the administrative apparatus 
and the presidential patronage network; the knowledge and skills to play 
the system; (autonomous) economic power in the form of the ability to 
access revenue without depending on the political centre; and interna-
tional and regional connections and support, including from government 
officials of neighbouring countries. These skill sets and networks of 
contacts were different from those that were needed during the Congo 
Wars, which created renewed space to be included in power structures. 
As a consequence, the political settlement that emerged during the 
transition was relatively fluid. 
33 Christine Bell and Jan Pospisil, ‘Negotiating Inclusion: the space of the formalised 
political unsettlement’, Journal of International Development, forthcoming. 
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The introduction of multi-party democracy made the transitional 
political settlement even more dynamic. The transition was to be ended 
through general elections, which were eventually held in 2006. Elections 
required ex-belligerents striving to hold on to power to build up a voter 
base, for which they needed a measure of popularity. Some groups, 
however, anticipated weak electoral results and believed that resorting 
to violence could compensate for a lack of popularity and formal political 
representation.34 A key example was a group of dissidents within the 
RCD, a faction whose limited popularity meant little chance of holding 
on to power via the ballot box. This group, which was dominated by 
Tutsi officers and politicians, decided to withdraw from the transitional 
process and institutions. This decision was also motivated by fear for 
their own safety and that of the Tutsi community, who had been subject 
to a long history of harassment. Based in their former stronghold in 
North Kivu, they formed a new insurgent movement that was eventu-
ally named the Congrès national pour la défense du peuple (CNDP, National 
Congress for the Defence of the People).35 
The CNDP quickly grew to be one of the most powerful rebel 
movements after the transition. Its strength partly lay in the movement 
being embedded in cross-border elite networks, linked to Rwanda, in 
particular. The Tutsi politicians, businesspeople and officers driving the 
CNDP maintained close links to Rwandan government officials, army 
officers and diaspora members.36 At the same time, there was a measure of 
collusion between the CNDP and parts of the Congolese state apparatus, 
including ex-RCD officers in the government security forces who were 
part of the presidential patronage network.37 One of the incentives these 
34 Jason Stearns, Judith Verweijen and Maria Eriksson Baaz,’The National Army 
and Armed Groups in the Eastern Congo. Untangling the Gordian Knot of Insecurity’, 
Usalama Project, London: Rift Valley Institute, 2013.
35 Jason Stearns, ‘From CNDP to M23. The Evolution of an Armed Movement in 
Eastern Congo, Usalama Project, London: Rift Valley Institute, 2012. 
36 Stearns, ‘From CNDP to M23’.
37 Stephanie Wolters, ‘Trouble in Eastern DRC: The Nkunda Factor’, Situation Report, 
Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2007. 
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officers had for colluding with the CNDP was that it provided them with 
influence over the armed group, which in turn translated into leverage in 
Kinshasa. The presidential patronage network expected these figures to 
help contain the menace of the CNDP—including through negotiations—
and therefore offered them significant advantages, such as positions of 
importance and leeway in private revenue-generating activities. 
A similar pattern emerged in relation to other ex-belligerent factions 
refusing to demobilize or integrate all their troops into the FARDC. 
Army officers or politicians maintaining contacts with these armed 
remnants saw their political weight increase accordingly, as the presi-
dential patronage network needed them to contain the potential threat 
these factions posed.38 This development shows how porous the bound-
aries between the state and non-state spheres became—in part due to 
the messy character of the army integration process and the wholesale 
integration of ex-rebel networks into the state apparatus. This complex 
situation remained unchanged after the transition ended in 2006, since 
many of the war-era militarized networks remained partially intact—
neither completely integrated into the state apparatus nor completely 
dissolved—though often changed in form. Moreover, a number of 
integrated army officers deserted and formed new armed groups. 
38 Judith Verweijen, ‘The Ambiguity of Militarization. The complex interaction 
between the Congolese armed forces and civilians in the Kivu provinces, eastern DR 
Congo’, PhD dissertation, Utrecht University, Utrecht, 2015. 
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3. The post-transitional political 
settlement 
The 2006 elections consolidated the power of the incumbent, President 
Joseph Kabila, who had ruled the country since his father’s death in 
2001. The result of this electoral victory was a further concentration of 
power in the presidential patronage network, a process that had already 
commenced during the transition.39 This trend intensified markedly 
after he also won the 2011 elections, which were generally recognized as 
flawed.40 The concentration of Kabila’s power since 2001 is double-edged; 
on the one hand, it has rendered the post-transitional political settlement 
increasingly exclusive, on the other it has allowed for a certain amount 
of stability, at least at the national level. 
This relative national-level stability, however, has not translated into 
stability in the east. In contrast to other parts of the country, armed 
groups have continued to be active in a zone stretching from northern 
Katanga (mostly in what is now Tanganyika Province) up to Haut-Uélé in 
former Orientale Province, although the majority operate in the two Kivu 
provinces. With the exception of the former rebel group CNDP, its now 
equally defunct successor group the Mouvement du 23 Mars (M23, March 23 
Movement), and a number of large-scale non-Congolese rebel groups of 
neighbouring states, notably the Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda 
(FDLR, Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda), few of these 
groups have posed a direct threat to Kinshasa or played significant roles 
in regional geopolitics. In fact, while growing in number in recent years, 
the relative size of armed groups and the geographical spheres under 
their influence have continued to diminish. Armed groups also play a 
decreasing role in the national political arena. It is no longer the case, as 
39 International Crisis Group, ‘Securing Congo’s Elections: Lessons from the Kinshasa 
Showdown’, Africa Briefing 42, Nairobi/Brussels, 2 October 2006. 
40 The Carter Center, ‘Presidential and Legislative Elections in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo. Final Report’, Atlanta, GA: The Carter Center, 28 August 2011.
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it was during the transition, that threatening violence and armed rebel-
lion translates directly into political advantages at the national level.41 
Armed groups’ declining relevance in national politics does not imply 
a disconnection from the national political arena, although the depth of 
their ties varies. Politicians, such as ministers and members of national 
parliament, and officers of the national armed forces, all continue to 
maintain links with armed groups. Nonetheless, the extent to which such 
links directly influence their power position at the national level seems 
to have decreased. In contrast to the transition, however, the related 
benefits are often more indirect than direct and are more strongly tied to 
personal networks than to organized political parties or factions. 
While armed groups’ influence has decreased at the national level, in 
the east, both in provincial politics and the areas in which these groups 
operate, it has remained unchanged or has even been reinforced. In 
particular, local authorities and elites, such as customary chiefs, territo-
rial administrators and businesspeople, draw heavily on armed groups. In 
order to understand this paradox, it is important to gain a basic insight 
into the nature of the current national-level political settlement and 
how this settlement shapes the incentive structures for policies towards 
armed groups in the east. 
Relative stability through co-optation and coercion
The uncontested centre of gravity of the current political settlement is 
the presidential patronage network, which is part of and tries to control 
ongoing power competition at the national level and between the centre 
and provincial and sub-provincial elites. The inner circle of this network 
forms a type of parallel government, which has a strong influence on the 
government, the national assembly, the higher echelons of the admin-
istration, parastatals and key parts of the security apparatus, such as 
41 Judith Verweijen and Claude Iguma Wakenge, ‘Understanding armed group 
proliferation in the eastern Congo’, PSRP Briefing Paper 7, London: Rift Valley Institute, 
December 2015.
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the presidential guard and military intelligence.42 Within these state 
institutions, the presidential circle establishes and maintains control by 
co-opting officials in key positions, forging personalized bonds of loyalty 
in exchange for access to power and revenue-generating possibilities. The 
presidential inner circle, however, also deploys a fair amount of coercion: 
Those whose loyalty is questioned are subjected to threats, intimidation, 
prosecution, removal from office and other forms of harassment and 
disadvantages, such as being denied permits or contracts.43 Ultimately, 
despite ongoing power competition, it is through the relative effective-
ness of these measures of control and co-optation that the presidential 
circle manages to maintain the overall stability of the political settlement 
at the national level. 
The presidential circle prioritizes the consolidation of its own power 
over being inclusive, relying primarily on those deemed most loyal, a 
large share of whom originate from various parts of the former Katanga 
Province.44 Even though strategic efforts are occasionally made to co-opt 
figures with support bases in other parts of the country or who have 
different political colours,45 the political settlement has become increas-
ingly exclusive. Access to the government, which encompasses both those 
in the core circle of the presidential entourage and those in second-tier 
networks, is conditional upon being from a political party that belongs 
to the ruling coalition. At the core of this coalition, known since 2011 as 
Majorité présidentielle (MP, Presidential Majority), stands the party of the 
42 Colette Braeckman, ‘Quelques questions sur le système Kabila’, Le Soir. Le Carnet 
de Colette Braeckman, 10 April 2010; Marianne Meunier, ‘La méthode Kabila: le premier 
cercle’, Jeune Afrique, 25 May 2009; Philippe Perdrix, ‘RDC : Joseph Kabila peut-il 
changer?’, Jeune Afrique, 3 May 2012. 
43 Fédération Internationale des Ligues des Droits de l’Homme, Ligue des Électeurs, 
Groupe Lotus and ASADHO, ‘République démocratique du Congo. La dérive autoritaire 
du régime’, Paris: Fédération internationale des Ligues des Droits de l’Homme, 2009; 
International Crisis Group, ‘Is Democratic Change Possible?’, Report 225/Africa, 5 May 
2015.
44 International Crisis Group, ‘Katanga, Tensions in DR Congo’s Mineral Heartland’, 
Report 239/Africa, 3 August 2016.
45 International Crisis Group, ‘Is Democratic Change Possible?’.
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president, the Parti du peuple pour la reconstruction et la démocratie (PPRD, 
People’s Party for Reconstruction and Democracy). It is largely the PPRD 
and its allies that control access to the state apparatus, such as positions 
in parastatals, customs agencies and the territorial administration. 
The opposition, by contrast, is largely excluded from these positions, 
reflecting the zero-sum nature of Congolese politics. Moreover, due to 
the autocratic tendencies of the government, political and civil liberties 
are regularly infringed upon and opposition figures are obstructed in 
their activities.46 
While the 500-seat legislature is fairly diverse, consisting of represen-
tatives from 98 different political parties,47 it is also fragmented. Among 
those that are represented, 76 parties have five or fewer seats. Moreover, 
the legislature is dominated by the governing coalition, which is under 
strong influence of the presidential patronage network. Key decision-
making does not take place via formal legislative and policy processes 
but occurs via backroom deals by presidential advisors.48 The presiden-
tial circle also has significant influence over the upper echelons of the 
provincial administration. In 2007, when the newly elected members of 
the provincial assemblies elected governors, Kabila’s entourage invested 
heavily in influencing the outcomes of the elections. Similar efforts were 
undertaken in 2016, when gubernatorial elections were held for the new 
provinces that were created a year earlier under the framework of the 
decentralization process.49 Fifteen of the 21 newly elected governors are 
members of the PPRD or other pro-government parties.50 There are also 
46 International Crisis Group, ‘Congo: A Stalled Democratic Agenda’, Report 73/Africa, 
8 April 2010. 
47 The Carter Center, ‘Presidential and Legislative Elections’.
48 Philippe Perdrix, ‘RDC: Augustin Katumba Mwanke, l’homme qui murmurait à 
l’oreille de Kabila’, Jeune Afrique, 27 February 2012; International Crisis Group, ‘Stalled 
Democratic Agenda’.
49 The 2006 constitution stipulates a decentralization process, entailing a 
multiplication of the number of provinces from 11 to 26 and the devolution of powers to 
and greater financial autonomy for the provincial level. 
50 International Crisis Group, ‘Katanga’.
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other signs that the political centre, which is dominated by the presiden-
tial patronage network, tries to manipulate the decentralization process 
in order to strengthen its grip on the provinces. For instance, the national 
government has consistently denied the provinces their constitutionally 
stipulated financial autonomy by withholding a part of the tax revenues 
to which they are entitled.51
Despite the presidential patronage network’s growing concentra-
tion of power and its increasing hold on the provinces, its control has 
remained patchy. While it has substantial power over the government, 
including key administrative and security agencies, it does not exercise 
centralized, bureaucratic control over the entire state apparatus nor 
does its power reach to all corners of the national territory. Crucially, 
power is largely projected through patronage networks, rather than via 
administrative hierarchies, and lower echelons of state agencies often 
act with a relatively high degree of autonomy. As a result, the state 
apparatus’s effectiveness in policy implementation and public service 
provision remains poor.52 
Although the political centre has managed to gradually extend its 
control over areas formerly controlled by semi-autonomous milita-
rized networks, its penetration is still highly uneven, and sometimes 
resisted by local elites. Local actors often continue to exercise influence 
over the lower echelons of the territorial administration and parts of 
security agencies. Consequently, the political centre’s attempts to extend 
control in some regions, are subject to complex processes of coercion 
and co-optation addressed to local elites. In many cases, control remains 
indirect, bypassing national administrative hierarchies and agencies, 
and depending instead on the personal loyalties of local strongmen and 
51 Pierre Englebert and Emmanuel Kasongo Mungongo, ‘Misguided and misdiagnosed: 
the failure of decentralisation reforms in the DR Congo’, African Studies Review, 59/1 
(2016). 
52 Pierre Englebert, ‘Congo blues. Scoring Kabila’s rule’, Atlantic Council, Africa 
Center, Issue Brief, May 2016. 
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women.53 Such indirect control, with minimal bureaucratic foundations, 
is fluid and uncertain, necessitating constant negotiation. 
Intense bargaining with local elites only takes place in areas deemed 
worth the effort of establishing and maintaining control. Similar to the 
Mobutu era, the presidential network focuses its efforts on politically and 
economically strategic sites and sectors, notably the capital city, indus-
trial extractive enclaves and crucial import–export routes. As in the past, 
industrial copper and cobalt mining in the former Katanga province is 
still the core source of income for both the Congolese state and the presi-
dential patronage network. This sector is the single biggest generator 
of export earnings (constituting 79 per cent in 2015) and together with 
industrial diamond production—of much lesser importance—accounts 
for approximately 20 per cent of GDP. 54 
Another important revenue source is oil exploitation off the Atlantic 
coast, in the western part of the country, though dwarfed by indus-
trial mining. Mining and oil concessions—also present in the Kivus and 
former Orientale Province, and in majority licensed for exploration rather 
than exploitation—generate revenue that can be spent in a discretionary 
manner, for instance as patronage resources or on election campaigns. 
One way to raise such discretionary resources is to sell licenses or 
shares of the state mining company Société genérale des carrières et des mines 
(Gécamines, General Society of Quarries and Mines) to offshore shell 
companies. In many cases, these assets are subsequently sold at hugely 
increased prices to companies that plan to invest in the involved projects. 
These practices reached a climax in the run-up to the 2011 elections, 
53 Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers, ‘New political order in the DR Congo?’; Timothy 
Raeymaekers, ‘Protection for sale? War and the transformation of regulation on the 
Congo–Ugandan border’, Development and Change, 41/4 (2010). 
54 Aaron Ross, ‘Congo’s copper output falls on low prices, gold rises’, Reuters, 10 
February 2016. 
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when they were used in part to finance the electoral campaign of the 
PPRD.55 
In sum, Katanga, due to its function as an economic powerhouse and 
its heavy representation in the presidential inner circle, is crucial to the 
political and economic survival of the incumbent president. Aside from 
the capital, other parts of the country are generally of lesser impor-
tance, though still contain areas and actors of political, economic or 
military significance to the presidential patronage network. The result 
is uneven governance, both materially in terms of investments like road 
and energy, as well as politically, as reflected in levels of control. This 
situation also shapes policies towards the conflict-affected zones in the 
east, the majority of which are located in the Kivu provinces. 
Shaping policies towards the east
The eastern Congo presents a variety of entwined political, economic 
and military-strategic threats and opportunities to the presidential power 
circle, which it addresses through patronage politics and formal policy-
making. To fully understand these formal and informal policies it is 
important to emphasize that, in continuation with the Mobutu era,56 
much policymaking appears to take place in an ad hoc and reactive 
manner, rather than being informed by grand strategies. One cause 
of this is Kabila’s style of governance, characterized by deferring and 
delaying critical policy decisions.57 Moreover, unexpected crises in the 
east, such as the 2012 M23 rebellion, encourage short-term solutions 
over long-term policy development and implementation. Furthermore, 
decisions made in Kinshasa are not always implemented on the ground, 
since those lower down the hierarchy subvert or redirect policies to 
55  Africa Progress Panel, ‘Equity in Extractives: Stewarding Africa’s Natural Resources 
for All’, Africa Progress Report 2013, Geneva, Switzerland: Africa Progress Panel, 2013; 
Global Witness, ‘News Over Ownership of Congolese Oil Blocks Raises Concerns’, Press 
Release, 29 June 2012.
56 Michael Schatzberg, ‘”Le mal zairois”: why policy fails in Zaire’. African Affairs 81/324 
(1982).
57 Englebert, ‘Congo blues’.
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their own ends.58 It is often difficult, as a result, to determine whether 
interventions are a result of the political centre’s policies or the sum of 
the uncoordinated decisions by various stakeholders at different levels, 
which may well have unintended consequences.
The presidential circle’s economic stakes in the eastern Congo are 
relatively low. The region’s biggest source of potential revenue is artisanal 
mining. State regulation of this sector, however, remains partial and the 
higher echelons of the relevant state agencies do not fully control their 
agents on the ground. While these higher echelons do appropriate a 
part of the revenues raised through taxation and extortion for private 
and particularistic purposes, the amounts remain limited compared to 
industrial mining. In contrast to industrial mining concessions, the presi-
dential circle makes limited money from the distribution of artisanal 
mining titles, which can be obtained at relatively low cost. Expanding 
industrial mining in the east is therefore an attractive option for the 
presidential circle.59 
The artisanal mining sector in the Kivus, however, does hold indirect 
importance for the president and his network, since it is a source of 
patronage resources. A proportion of taxes that state agents collect from 
artisanal mining sites, as well as other revenue obtained via fines and 
extortion, is informally channelled to their superiors. This system—
commonly known as rapportage (returning)—allows the upper echelons 
of state agencies, including the security and intelligence services, to 
make significant amounts of money.60 The presidential circle has the 
power to appoint and remove people from these lucrative positions, 
through which it can foster loyalty and maintain control. Moreover, 
since rapportage allows payoffs to key allies without involving additional 
state resources, it is a low-cost system of control. A similar mechanism 
58 Eriksson Baaz and Verweijen, ‘Volatility of a half-cooked bouillabaisse’.
59 Sara Geenen and Jana Hönke, ‘Land grabbing by mining companies: local 
contentions and state reconfiguration in South Kivu (DRC)’, in Losing Your Land: 
Dispossession in the Great Lakes, eds. An Ansoms and Thea Hilhorst, Oxford: James Currey. 
60 Maria Eriksson Baaz and Ola Olsson, ‘Feeding the horse: unofficial economic 
activities within the police force in the DR Congo’, African Security 4/4 (2011).
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applies to informal business dealings. It is well documented that, for 
example, senior army officers in the presidential patronage network 
make considerable money from artisanal mining in the east.61 Co-opting 
these figures implies tolerance for these less transparent dealings and 
ultimately enhances the power of those in the presidential circle. When 
these clients fall out of favour, the government can rotate them to lower 
positions or instigate judicial action, based on their involvement in illicit 
practices.62 
While the presidential circle may allow some economic latitude to 
its clients in areas too difficult or unrewarding to control, it does seek 
more direct control over political and economic resources too lucrative 
to remain under the control of autonomous local networks. The origins 
of these local power complexes can be partly traced to the militarized 
networks that controlled these areas during the Second Congo War.63 
A good example is the Grand Nord (northern North Kivu) where after 
the Second Congo War, networks related to the former rebel movement 
Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie/Kisangani–Mouvement de libéra-
tion (RCD/K–ML, Congolese Rally for Democracy/Kisangani–Liberation 
Movement) strived for continued domination in the local administra-
tion and security agencies. These included customs and border control 
agencies (at border posts with Uganda), the civilian intelligence service 
and the territorial administration.64 When allied local elites resisted the 
presidential circle’s efforts to increase its access to these agencies and 
related revenues, it attempted to replace them with members of its own 
patronage network. The result was a fierce power struggle that provides 
a strong impetus to current conflict dynamics in the Beni region.65
61 For an example, see: United Nations, Security Council, ‘Final Report of the Group of 
Experts on the Democratic Republic of Congo’, 29 November 2010, S/2010/596, 55–56. 
62 Verweijen, ‘Ambiguity of Militarization’.
63 Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers, ‘New political order in the DR Congo?’. 
64 Raeymaekers, Violent Capitalism. 
65 Judith Verweijen, ‘Pompier-pyromanocracy. Mbusa Nyamwisi and the DR Congo’s 
inflammable post-settlement political order’, in Warlord Democrats in Africa: Ex-Military 
Leaders and Electoral Politics, ed. Anders Thémner, London: Zed Books (forthcoming, 2017).
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The presidential circle’s policies towards the east are also shaped by 
the electoral system. Votes decide who stays in office and who does not. 
In 2011, the two relatively densely populated Kivu provinces combined 
counted for nearly 16 per cent of the country’s registered voters.66 
Between 2006 and 2011 Kabila’s popularity in the region plummeted. 
In 2006, Kabila won almost 95 per cent of the vote in South Kivu and 
around 78 per cent in North Kivu (and in the runoff, 98 and 96 per cent, 
respectively). In the 2011 presidential elections, which had a single round, 
the president only polled 45 per cent in South Kivu and 39 per cent in 
North Kivu.67 Given that these elections were marred with irregularities, 
these figures may not even accurately reflect the president’s actual drop 
in popularity. While election rigging partly offset the need for a popular 
support base, it undermined both his domestic and international legiti-
macy.68 This shows that the presidential circle does need to maintain 
a measure of popular support in the Kivus, even if the incentives are 
relatively weak. 
Regional geopolitics also impact the presidential circle’s policies 
towards the east. The countries of the Great Lakes region share a troubled 
history of mutual military invasions, proxy warfare and providing 
sanctuary to each other’s rebel groups. These dynamics reached their 
apex during the Second Congo War, when Congolese elites liaised with 
militaries, politicians and businesspeople from regional states to reinforce 
their positions. Such alliances forged and were the product of cross-
border economic networks that sometimes also encompassed diaspora 
populations.69 Parts of these networks continued to remain in force after 
the end of the Second Congo War, constituting a centrifugal force in 
66 The Carter Center, ‘Presidential and Legislative Elections’, 30.
67 Wikipedia, ‘Élection présidentielle de 2011 en République démocratique du Congo’. 
68 International Crisis Group, ‘Is Democratic Change Possible?’.
69 Gérard Prunier, Africa’s World War: Congo, the Rwandan Genocide, and the Making of a 
Continental Catastrophe, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009; Filip Reyntjens, The Great 
African War: Congo and Regional Geopolitics, 1996–2006, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2009.
38 STABLE INSTABILITY
the Congo’s political settlement.70 The Rwandan government remained 
actively involved in the eastern Congo via intermediaries, including the 
rebel group CNDP, and later the M23.71 Rwandan backing made these 
rebel groups particularly threatening. The waning of Rwandan involve-
ment in Congolese armed groups after 2013—a development that may 
prove temporary—has since significantly reduced the threat of armed 
mobilization in the east.
Unstable stabilization efforts
Over time, the presidential circle’s ability to deploy effective military 
force has increased, with a firmer grip of the presidential military office 
(the maison militaire) on key parts of the armed forces and the completion 
of the training of various foreign-trained light infantry units, which are 
among the most effective and loyal parts of the armed forces.72 Addition-
ally, from 2009 onwards, the Mission de l’Organisation des Nations Unies pour 
la stabilisation en République démocratique du Congo (MONUSCO, United 
Nations Mission for Stabilization in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo), has collaborated more actively with the FARDC than in the past, 
providing logistical and other support to its military operations. The 
presidential circle’s greater capacity to address major military threats 
has lessened the need to co-opt political-military entrepreneurs, which 
has induced a parallel decline of armed groups’ relevance in national 
politics. 
Yet, maintaining contacts with armed groups has not become entirely 
worthless for those seeking enhanced political power at the national 
level. The presidential patronage network still has incentives to keep a 
degree of indirect leverage over armed groups via intermediaries. Such 
incentives, however, are much feebler when it concerns small-scale 
70 Raeymaekers, ‘Protection for sale?’.
71 Stearns, ‘From CNDP to M23’.
72 The presidential circle’s increased capacity to deploy effective military force was 
evidenced by the defeat of the M23, see: Jason Stearns, ‘As the M23 Nears Defeat More 
Answers than Questions’, Congo Siasa, 30 October 2013.; Darren Olivier, ‘How M23 Was 
Rolled Back’, African Defence Review, 30 October 2013. 
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armed groups with limited political, financial and military clout that 
operate in remote areas and lack networks of strategic and economic 
importance.73 Due to the fragmentation of the armed group landscape 
over the past years, the majority of groups operating currently fall into 
this latter category.74 This undermines the potential value to national 
political elites of liaising with these groups. The diminishing role of 
armed groups and related networks in national politics and the fragmen-
tation of the armed group landscape in the east are, therefore, mutually 
reinforcing trends. 
Despite the decreasing threat that armed groups in the east pose to 
the presidential power circle, there are still cases where the latter has 
a direct or indirect interest in neutralizing these groups. Examples are 
when armed groups control zones of (potential) economic importance 
or are linked to local elites who control such zones, such as industrial 
gold mining concessions and border areas. Another case is when armed 
groups constitute a menace or nuisance, not so much to the presidential 
circle but to its local allies. The former may then allow military opera-
tions to be conducted against these groups without this being directly 
in its own interest. For instance, when the CNDP was integrated into 
the FARDC as a separate network between 2009 and 2012, it initiated 
numerous military operations. These operations were often primarily 
aimed to settle old scores or extend control over lucrative areas, such as 
artisanal mining sites.75 Kinshasa accepted these operations from which 
it did not directly benefit, to pacify the CNDP and maintain its loyalty. 
Finally, armed groups that do not currently pose a threat may do so in 
the future. For example, it may be the case that external powers begin 
to court them or that they forge coalitions with other more powerful 
73 Hugo de Vries, ‘Going Around in Circles. The Challenges of Peacekeeping and 
Stabilization in the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, CRU Report, The Hague: 
Clingendael, Netherlands Institute for International Relations, August 2015. 
74 Verweijen and Iguma Wakenge, ‘Understanding armed group proliferation’. 
75 International Crisis Group, ‘Congo: No Stability in Kivu despite a Rapprochement 
with Rwanda’, Report 165/Africa, 16 November 2010. 
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groups.76 It is, therefore, expedient for the presidential circle to maintain 
these groups within certain bounds and safeguard a minimum of leverage 
over them. 
The incentives for the political centre to demobilize armed groups 
that do not constitute a direct major threat, however, remain weak, 
especially since there are potential benefits in the groups’ continued 
existence. Some politicians allied to the presidential circle derive part of 
their strength, income and popularity from their connections to armed 
groups.77 Keeping the power base of these allies intact also ensures the 
continued influence of the presidential circle. It might, therefore, tolerate 
the armed groups to which these figures are linked. This is especially the 
case where the politicians in question are able to mobilize the electorate 
for the pro-government camp. For instance, during the 2011 elections, a 
local strongman in Masisi, Erasto Ntibaturama, who commands a group 
of local defence forces, compelled the electorate to vote for the incum-
bent president (as well as his own son, a candidate for the national 
assembly), with the support of ex-CNDP officers who had integrated 
into the FARDC.78 Other politicians close to the presidential camp are 
also reported to maintain contacts with armed groups.79 It is no different 
for opposition politicians who often try to reinforce their support by 
spreading the same anti-government discourses that many armed groups 
use—a rhetoric that resonates among those who are discontent with the 
current social-political order.80 Hence, both pro and anti-government 
politicians liaise with armed groups. This further testifies to the complex 
76 A good example is the M23 and its backers, who reached out to several smaller 
armed groups in Ituri and the Kivu provinces. See: United Nations, Security Council, 
‘Final Report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of Congo’, 15 
November 2012, S/2012/843. 
77 Stearns, Verweijen and Eriksson Baaz, ‘The National Army and Armed Groups’. 
78 Human Rights Watch, ‘DR Congo: Rein in Security Forces. Tensions Mount Ahead 
of Election Results’, Press Release, 2 December 2011; UN Security Council, S/2010/596.
79 For an example, see Wikileaks, ‘The APCLS. The Hunde Military Force’, 18 
November 2009. 
80 Jason Stearns et al. ‘Mai-Mai Yakutumba: Resistance and Racketeering in Fizi, South 
Kivu’, Usalama Project, London: Rift Valley Institute, 2013. 
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nature of armed mobilization in the eastern Congo, which straddles state 
and non-state, government and non-government spheres.
This complexity is further reflected in the occasional use by govern-
ment security forces of armed groups, including rebel movements of 
neighbouring states present in the east, such as the Rwandan-led FDLR,81 
as proxies or allies in the fight against other armed groups. This practice 
was particularly widespread in the struggle against the CNDP82 and to 
a lesser extent the M23.83 Such proxy strategies should partly be seen as 
low-cost compensation for the structural and operational weaknesses 
of the government security forces. It is also part of a broader pattern 
of collusion between the national army and armed groups, which is 
often more an outcome of the ad hoc practices commanders employ on 
the ground than the result of top-down military strategy. It is widely 
documented that FARDC commanders maintain assorted contacts with 
armed groups, for instance to enable mutually profitable economic activi-
ties, to sell arms and ammunition or to arrange non-aggression pacts.84 
Such lower-level arrangements, however, do not prevent ongoing 
FARDC military operations against armed groups. Army commanders 
are keen to conduct such operations since they are an important source of 
income and influence. Such operations allow them to appropriate some 
of the funds allocated to operations, command bonuses and, in some 
cases, generate additional income on the side; for instance, when military 
operations extend army control over areas rich in natural resources or 
when they allow the army to extract resources from the population 
through imposed contributions or extortion. In sum, military opera-
tions generate extra resources for a severely underpaid army and allow 
the presidential circle to appoint and withdraw commanders from much 
81 DR Congo Affinity Group, ‘FDLR. Past, Present and Policies’, New York: Social 
Science Research Council, 24 March 2014.
82 Jason Stearns. ‘PARECO. Land, Local Strongmen and the Roots of Militia Politics in 
North Kivu’, Usalama Project, London: Rift Valley Institute, 2012.
83 United Nations, Security Council, ‘Final Report of the Group of Experts on the 
Democratic Republic of Congo’, 23 January 2014, S/2014/42.
84 UN Security Council, S/2010/596. 
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desired command positions. They therefore enhance—in a relatively low 
cost manner—the presidential circle’s grip on a volatile army in the Kivus 
that is still riddled with parallel command chains.85 
The eastern Congo’s ongoing situation of violent conflict has become a 
political resource for the presidential circle in other ways too. Poverty in 
many parts of the western Congo is worse than in the east. A recent study 
on multidimensional poverty among women, for instance, ranks Kasaï-
Occidental and Kasaï-Oriental (West Kasai and East Kasai, respectively) 
as the provinces where female well-being was lowest in 2010.86 The 
vast majority of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and United 
Nations (UN) agencies, however, operate in the east, since they prioritize 
operations in zones of armed conflict. The presence of this plethora of 
humanitarian, development and peacebuilding structures, as well as the 
accompanying influx of expatriates, is a source of tax revenues for the 
national and provincial governments. The aid industry has, moreover, 
become a crucial pillar of the economy in the eastern Congo, creating 
employment and increasing demand for imported consumer goods, real 
estate and services such as hotels, gastronomy and entertainment.87 
Since the current elites largely control access to opportunities and 
resources that development and humanitarian initiatives open up, these 
interventions often end up strengthening existing power relations. Local 
elites also try to harness these initiatives to their own ends. They may, 
for example, distribute contracts to their clients or present themselves 
as the initiators or financers of projects that in reality were funded with 
aid money.88 Finally, international donor efforts free the government 
of its duty to invest in basic service provision. NGOs build, equip and 
85 Verweijen, ‘Ambiguity of Militarization’.
86 Nanivazo Malokele and Kristi Mahrt, ‘Spatial and Temporal Analyses of Women’s 
Wellbeing in the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, WIDER Working Paper 2015/059, 
Helsinki: United Nations University World Institute for Development Economics 
Research, August 2015.
87 Karen Büscher and Koen Vlassenroot, ‘Humanitarian presence and urban 
development: new opportunities and contrasts in Goma, DRC’, Disasters 34/S2 (2013).
88 De Vries, ‘Going Around in Circles’.
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run healthcare centres, provide free medication, construct water wells, 
and distribute tools and seeds.89 This donor engagement also reduces 
the possibility that conditions in the east could become dire enough to 
provoke revolt against the government. 
Ongoing violent conflict in the east has become part of the status quo, 
which elites at various levels have a vested interest to maintain. This 
complex incentive structure inhibits efforts to end armed group activity 
and stabilize the east. Instead, the presidential circle appears to prioritize 
low-cost and short-term policies, such as the containment rather than 
the sustainable demobilization of armed groups. In doing so, it seems to 
prefer solutions that strengthen its grip on the state apparatus by gener-
ating new patronage resources, for instance, through military operations. 
These policies have further entrenched the role of armed groups in the 
sub-national political settlements in the east.
89 Englebert, ‘Congo blues’.
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4. Armed groups and political 
settlements in the east 
After more than two decades of ongoing violent conflict, armed groups 
have become a central feature of political settlements in the eastern 
Congo. These groups have significant influence on the power and 
practices of the political, military and economic elites who are the main 
actors in these settlements. Armed groups have, as a result, come to play 
an important role in local governance configurations within their spheres 
of operation. Not only do they try to govern civilians in their operational 
areas directly (for instance, by engaging in justice provision and conflict 
resolution), they also exercise significant influence on the governance 
practices of local authorities, such as administrators, members of the 
security services and state-recognized customary chiefs. They may, for 
example, become arbiters in local power struggles by liaising with one 
faction or the other, or shore up the power of friendly local authorities 
by helping them to enforce decisions. 
Armed groups and their military strength wax and wane depending 
on the conjuncture of factors such as military operations and the activi-
ties of other armed groups, shifts in local alliances and allies, and levels 
of support from the population. Changes in an armed group’s fortunes 
tend to bring about wider shifts in the local political settlement. Equally, 
changes in the civilian dimension of the political settlement—for instance, 
the victory of a particular faction in a customary power dispute or the 
acquisition of a mining concession by an economic operator—may, in 
turn, have repercussions for an armed group.90
90 For examples, see: Judith Verweijen, ‘A Microcosm of Militarization. Conflict, 
Governance and Armed Mobilization in Uvira, South Kivu’, Usalama Project, PSRP, 
London: Rift Valley Institute, 2016; Koen Vlassenroot, Emery Mudinga and Kasper 
Hoffmann, ‘Contesting Authority. Armed Rebellion and Military Fragmentation in 
Walikale and Kalehe, North and South Kivu’, Usalama Project, PSRP, London: Rift Valley 
Institute, 2016.
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Overall, the relative influence of armed groups on the eastern Congo’s 
various local political settlements is relatively stable. Groups that disap-
pear are often rapidly succeeded by others, whether operating as full-time 
armed groups or as village-based local defence forces. The Congolese 
armed forces, for their part, rarely succeed in permanently occupying 
areas formerly under armed group control, often withdrawing to conduct 
operations elsewhere. Consequently, many areas are under alternating 
control of armed groups and the national armed forces.91 This points to 
another continuity in the eastern Congo’s political settlements; namely, 
that the general role of political-military entrepreneurs continues to 
be significant—whether they are part of or linked to state or non-state 
armed forces. 
In this conflicted region, not being able to draw on the leverage and 
protection armed actors can bring often leads to difficulties in business, 
increased levels of harassment by state agents and greater risks of being 
attacked. It also yields comparative advantages to personal and political 
competitors and opponents who are able to mobilize force. The elevated 
significance of armed actors in non-military domains of social life, such 
as politics, the economy and local governance, reflects (militarization) 
processes that are both a cause and result of the weakness of civilian 
authority. While individual civilian authorities may see their position 
strengthened by liaising with armed groups or the army, at the level of 
the eastern Congo as a whole, their influence has been weakened by the 
role of men and women with guns.92
Despite the eastern Congo’s potential for flux, its instability is, for the 
most part, stable. The role of armed actors remains unchanged and levels 
of militarization do not fluctuate significantly. There is also stability 
in other respects. While many armed groups are dissatisfied with the 
current social-political order, as well as the performance of the state in 
91 Steven Van Damme, ‘Commodities of war. Communities speak out on the true cost 
of conflict in eastern DRC’, 164 Oxfam Briefing Paper, Oxford: Oxfam GB for Oxfam 
International, November 2012. 
92 Verweijen, ‘Ambiguity of Militarization’. 
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that order, their own practices often strongly mimic those of state actors, 
in particular the armed forces, including their predatory and violent 
character. Armed group discourses similarly remain firmly inscribed in 
the idea of the nation-state and the state-controlled social-political order, 
despite armed groups’ opposition to the current holders of power.93 Due 
to their multiple links to state actors, which helps shore up the latter’s 
power, armed groups also contribute indirectly to the perpetuation of 
the current order. In order to better understand the resulting stable 
instability—or how armed groups contribute to reproducing the current 
order—it is necessary to analyse the social networks in which armed 
groups are embedded and how these straddle both state and non-state 
spheres.
Multi-layered social embedding
Armed groups are deeply embedded in multi-layered social networks, 
stretching from the very local level of their home area to the sub-regional 
and international level. Many smaller armed groups, most of which gener-
ically self-identify as ‘Mai-Mai’, are well connected to the home areas of 
their principal leaders, who tend to be from the same ethnic group. Their 
main recruitment and support base is usually also from the leadership’s 
home area and surroundings, sometimes extending to no more than a 
few villages. This creates close connections between the population and 
armed groups, which often consist of their brothers, sisters, sons, uncles, 
neighbours, friends, former classmates and colleagues. Because of these 
links, armed groups often participate in community life, such as the 30 
June celebrations (the Congo’s national independence day), and church 
and sports activities, furthering their social integration.94
The high degree of familiarization between community members and 
armed groups often leads to collaboration. People tend not to refuse food 
93 Raeymaekers, ‘Protection for sale?’; Kasper Hoffmann and Judith Verweijen, ‘The 
Strategic Reversibility of Stateness: Contemporary Mai-Mai Militias and Processes of 
State (un)Making in South Kivu, DR Congo’, paper presented at the Workshop on Armed 
Forces and Conflict Dynamics in the Great Lakes Region, Kampala, October 28–30, 2013.
94 Vlassenroot, Mudinga and Hoffmann, ‘Contesting Authority’. 
 ARMEd GROUPS ANd POLITICAL SETTLEMENTS IN ThE EAST 47
or shelter to a co-villager or relative, even when this person belongs to 
an armed group. Close community links also allow armed groups to 
hide and operate in relative secrecy, as community members withhold 
information on their whereabouts to the security services. Community 
members may additionally provide armed groups with local intelligence—
for instance, about who criticizes them or who is reluctant to make 
financial contributions—helping armed groups maintain social control 
and generate revenue. As locals, members of armed groups are usually 
closely acquainted with the local customary chief, who often figures as an 
intermediary between the armed group and the population.95 Customary 
chiefs from the village up to the chiefdom level tend to collaborate with 
armed groups in varying ways. They may, for instance, collect in-kind 
contributions, such as cassava flour or goats, allow armed groups or 
their intermediaries to access the local market in order to collect taxes, 
or grant them access to the land of which they are the customary owners 
for activities such as logging or mining. The relations, power balance 
and division of labour between customary chiefs and armed groups do, 
however, differ greatly from one area to the next in ways that reflect 
complex negotiation processes and local power configurations.96
Other local authorities, including those with different ethnic and 
regional origins from those of the armed groups, also often choose not 
to confront them and may even collaborate. The reasons for collaboration 
usually differ per context, and reflect a mixture of fear and expedience. 
While some authorities merely try to protect themselves, others may 
seek financial gain or wish to bolster their position in a local conflict. 
Similar motivations are found in an armed group’s relations with other 
actors living and working in their operational areas, including churches, 
NGOs and small businesses. Many are forced to pay protection money 
in order to be able to continue their activities, including workers from 
95 Kasper Hoffmann, ‘Myths set in motion: the moral economy of Maï-Maï 
governance’, in Rebel Governance in Civil Wars, eds. Ana Arjona, Nelson Kasfir and 
Zachariah Mampilly, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016.
96 Vlassenroot, Mudinga and Hoffmann, ‘Contesting Authority’.
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international humanitarian organizations. Armed groups may pressure 
local staff to donate a part of their salary to the group, or oblige logis-
ticians to make arrangements to avoid ambushes on their convoys.97 
Members of NGOs, churches and the local business community may also 
collaborate as they have a measure of sympathy for armed groups and 
their political projects, or hope to gain benefits from liaising with them. 
Their active support may involve the use of organizational resources, 
which are sometimes financed with donor money.98
Many armed groups also have collaborators in larger towns and cities 
near to their rural locations. These supporters, who tend to have civilian 
jobs and occupation—as students, employees of development NGOs or 
traders—are often members of the armed group’s political branch or 
help with recruitment, logistics and intelligence. These urban-based 
members commonly originate from the armed group leadership’s home 
areas, being relatives or acquaintances. Their involvement tends to be 
voluntary, although they may also be put under pressure by threats made 
to their families back home.
The more intellectual among these urban-based supporters are 
usually involved in drawing up public declarations on behalf of the 
armed group, including the cahier des charges (list of demands) that armed 
groups address to the government as a condition for disarmament.99 
Others, such as those who work as motor-taxi drivers (and are often 
demobilized combatants), are specialized in intelligence gathering and 
logistics. Another category of urban collaborators is businesspeople and 
state agents working, for example, in hospitals, the education sector, 
customs services, the territorial administration or the security services. 
Their engagement with armed groups is equally varied. It ranges from 
passive and tacit tolerance—leaving known armed group collaborators 
97 Interviews with staff of humanitarian organizations, Goma, January 2012 and Baraka, 
December 2011. 
98 Judith Verweijen, ‘From autochthony to violence? Discursive and coercive social 
practices of the Mai Mai in Fizi, eastern DR Congo’, African Studies Review 58/2 (2015).
99 Justine Brabant, Qu’on nous laisse combattre et la guerre finira. Avec les combattants du Kivu, 
Paris: Éditions la Découverte, 2016.
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unhindered—to doing small favours—allowing armed group members 
to use internet or printing services for free—to more intense forms of 
collaboration, such as joint business operations.100
The next layer of supporters and collaborators can be found in the 
provincial and national capital cities, and in neighbouring countries. 
These individuals encompass those who work at provincial and national 
political institutions, such as members of parliament, ministers and their 
aides, businesspeople, and members of the security services (mostly 
army officers). Again, the nature of their relations and type of support 
varies substantially. Some offer (mostly verbal) endorsements of a 
specific armed group and its political vision; for instance, by antago-
nizing an ethnic community that the armed group has declared to fight. 
Other supporters try to influence high-ranking political and military 
decision-makers in favour of the armed group. They may, for example, 
convince these decision-makers not to launch military operations against 
a particular group or to open negotiations with them. A further category 
is characterized by its far-reaching support to armed groups, providing 
money or, in the case of army officers, selling munitions at a low price. 
Financial and political support may also be derived from diaspora 
populations, who in many cases share the same ethnic background as 
the armed group leadership. Diasporas based in the Great Lakes Region 
often help with fundraising, diplomacy (for example, contacting foreign 
officials), business activities including cross-border trade, and recruit-
ment among diaspora and refugee youth. Diaspora communities based in 
western countries tend to facilitate public relations, such as maintaining 
websites,101 and may provide limited financial donations.102 
100 For example, see: Verweijen, ‘Microcosm of Militarization’. 
101 An example is the Rwandan Rassemblement pour l’unité et la démocratie (RUD, Rally 
for Unity and Democracy)–Urunana, which operates in North Kivu. Its websites are 
hosted in the United States, where its political leadership is based, IPAddress.com, 
RUD-Urunana.org: http://rud-urunana.org.ipaddress.com. See: United Nations, Security 
Council, ‘Interim Report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of Congo’, 
25 May 2010, S/2010/252, 10.
102 For examples of such contacts, see: Stearns et al., ‘Mai-Mai Yakutumba’; Stearns, 
‘PARECO’; and Stearns, ‘From CNDP to M23’.
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Straddling state and non-state spheres
The multi-layered networks in which armed groups are embedded 
show that, paradoxically, many of their supporters and collaborators are 
state agents. These agents not only provide assistance to armed groups 
derived from their state employ, but they also manage to enhance their 
own power (in their capacity as state agents) by liaising with armed 
groups. One example is army commanders making use of armed groups 
as force multipliers during operations. Another is local authorities who 
are able to enforce decisions, such as the outcomes of dispute resolu-
tion, by calling on an armed group to intimidate people into accepting 
or implementing the decision; or politicians who are elected because 
armed groups put pressure on their electorate to vote for him or her. 
These examples show how non-state armed groups are an integral part 
of networks that straddle both state and non-state spheres.
State and non-state boundaries are further blurred by the similarities 
in appearance, structure and discourse between armed groups and the 
army. Many armed groups have adopted ranks and organizational hierar-
chies resembling those of the government security forces. For example, 
armed groups often have the same staff system, with differently numbered 
staff officers for various tasks, such as intelligence (S2), operations (S3) 
and logistics (S4). Many also wear uniforms, draw on practices and use 
discourses of governance that are similar to those of the state armed 
forces (albeit with their own particular twist).103 The ways armed groups 
extract resources from civilians, for instance, closely resemble those 
of the FARDC. Both sets of actors collect fees at roadblocks, demand 
contributions that are referred to as efforts de guerre (war efforts), and 
impose market taxes and in-kind house-to-house collections, such as 
donations of flour.104
In other areas, armed groups have evolved into de facto public authori-
ties. They often emulate government practices and structures, including 
nomenclature and bureaucratic procedure, in conflict resolution, 
103 Hoffmann and Verweijen, ‘Strategic Reversibility’.
104 Verweijen, ‘Ambiguity of Militarization’.
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justice issues and taxation, for instance, establishing courts or issuing 
documents with their own stamps. These routinized state-like practices 
and discourses encourage civilian compliance and serve to legitimize 
armed groups’ claims to authority, although employing them does not 
always stem from a conscious decision, but rather reflects the assump-
tions of what it is to govern.105 This shows how the state—in spite of 
the Congo’s experience of it—continues to be seen as the cornerstone 
of social and political organization, even by non-state armed groups.106
The continuing appeal of the idea of the state is also reflected in armed 
groups’ self-portrayal as upholders of the state-controlled order, and as 
striving for its improvement. The cahier des charges of 2 January 2011 of 
the Mai-Mai Kapopo (now defunct and formerly based in the Itombwe 
forest, in Mwenga territory, South Kivu), for example, states that they 
‘do not have as [their] objective to overthrow the democratically elected 
institutions of the Republic, but to:
• defend the territorial integrity and inviolability of the DR Congo 
against foreign forces
• fight against injustices, dictatorship, values antithetical to 
democracy and for the establishment of the rule of law
• protect the Congolese peoples and their goods’107
Armed groups do not propagate a social-political order other than that 
dominated by the state, calling instead for the Congolese state to conform 
more closely to the idealized notion of the nation state that is endorsed 
by western aid donors. Accordingly, their statements demand respect 
105 Hoffmann and Verweijen, ‘Strategic Reversibility’. See also: Kasper Hoffmann and 
Koen Vlassenroot. ‘Armed groups and the exercise of public authority: the cases of the 
Mayi-Mayi and Raya Mutomboki in Kalehe, South Kivu’, Peacebuilding 2/2 (2014).
106 Pierre Englebert, ‘Why Congo Persists: Sovereignty, Globalization and the Violent 
Reproduction of a Weak State’, QEH Working Paper 95, Oxford: Queen Elizabeth House, 
University of Oxford, 2003.
107 Kapopo Alunda, ‘Cahier des charges présenté au gouvernement de la RD Congo. 
Groupe Mai-Mai Kapopo. Division des Hauts-Plateaux. Etat-Major commandement’, 2 
January 2011, unpublished document, on file with the Rift Valley Institute.
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for territorial integrity, and advocate the promotion of democracy and 
the rule of law. 
In addition to expressing a desire to improve the state-controlled 
order, many armed groups demand direct access to it, framing this in the 
language of rights and entitlements. In particular, they make frequent 
demands for ranks and positions in the FARDC, and requests for access 
to state salaries and other benefits, which are often construed in terms 
of the payment of salary arrears (arriérés de solde) and financial support 
(prise en charge). The same Mai-Mai Kapopo cahier des charges demands 
(among its 22 points): 
‘2. To recognize the ranks and positions of the military and police 
officers issued from the Mai-Mai Kapopo (…)
8. Financial support for the war-wounded soldiers of the Mai-Mai 
Kapopo group by the Congolese state
9.  To improve the work conditions of the military (decent salary, 
proper rations, decent housing, appropriate medical care and 
guaranteed transport)
10. Payment of salary arrears to the soldiers and the provision of finan-
cial support to widows, orphans and war casualties’108 
Demands for salary arrears reflect armed groups’ self-perception as patri-
otic defenders of Congolese sovereign territory, who expel foreign armed 
groups, such as the FDLR, from their area. The 2013 cahier de charges of 
Nduma Defence of Congo (NDC)—based in Walikale and led by Ntabo 
Ntaberi Sheka—claims that ‘despite the imperfections of our struggle, 
nobody, except for the unthankful, is unaware that the causes we defend 
are noble. Thus, we have helped our government to restore its power 
over properties previously controlled by foreigners (the FDLR)’.109 
108  Kapopo Alunda, ‘Cahier des charges’. 
109 Ntabo Ntaberi Sheka, ‘Cahier du charges du mouvement N.D.C.’, unpublished 
document, on file with the Rift Valley Institute, no date. For an analysis of the NDC, 
see: United Nations, Security Council, ‘Final Report of the Group of Experts on the 
Democratic Republic of Congo’, 2 December 2011, S/2011/738, 59–65.
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Demands to access positions in the state apparatus and state-provided 
benefits may also be framed in narrow ethnic and regional terms. Armed 
groups’ particularistic views become especially clear in calls for improve-
ment of infrastructure and public service provision for certain areas, and 
in their demands for more political representation of a certain ethnic 
group or region (including through the transformation of the group’s 
political branch into a legally recognized political party). For instance, 
the Coalition des congolais pour la libération (CCL, Coalition of Congolese 
for Liberation), the former armed group led by the late Bede Rusagara,110 
demand that:
• ‘the sons and daughters of Uvira are also incorporated in the 
national government and are represented in Congolese diplomacy
• representativeness in the higher management functions of public 
enterprises
• in the provinces, that the sons and daughters of Uvira are also 
recruited in the public administration, in the capacity of division 
head’.111
Claims to high ranks in the army are similarly ethnically expressed: 
Kashologizi, the deputy commander of the Fuliiru-led (now defunct) 
Mai-Mai Mushombe states, ‘We want a Fuliiru general. The Banyamu-
lenge have numerous generals, even the Babembe. But we, the Bafuliiru, 
we are discriminated against.’112 
Demands for entitlements and claims to defend the rights of a partic-
ular constituency are often linked to the notion of autochthony, that 
is, claims of being the original inhabitants of a particular area, often to 
the detriment of newcomers and foreigners. Many of the Congo’s inter-
community conflicts are portrayed as stemming from this dichotomy 
110 On Bede Rusagara, see: Verweijen, ‘Microcosm of Militarization’.
111 Coalition des congolais pour la libération–Force de libération du Congo, ‘Cahier de charge’, 17 
December 2012, unpublished document, on file with the Rift Valley Institute. 
112 Interview with Kashama Ngoy (alias Kashologozi), Marungu, 11 November 2011.
54 STABLE INSTABILITY
between autochthons and outsiders, who are often identified as Rwando-
phones (Kinyarwanda-speaking people), Tutsi or Nilotics.113 
Armed groups employ similar discourses to rally popular and elite 
support.114 The president of the Fizi-based (South Kivu) Parti pour l’ action 
et la reconstruction du Congo (PARC, Party for Action and the Reconstruc-
tion of the Congo), the political branch of the Mai-Mai Yakutumba,115 
stated in an interview, ‘The biggest problem is that they, the Rwandans, 
want to install other entities of local governance. We cannot accept that 
a native chief [chef originaire] is subjected to the orders of a chiefdom 
of a so-called Munyamulenge. He has to exercise power over his whole 
jurisdiction. … ‘Native’ [originaire], this notion is very important to us.’116
Autochthonous discourse can also appeal to notions of patriotism, 
along with the defence of territorial integrity and the nation state as 
a whole, and even to universalist notions of democracy and freedom. 
While the CCL document makes claims to specific benefits for the ‘sons 
and daughters of Uvira’, it starts by saying that the CCL ‘is a Congolese 
politico-military movement created in 2010 with the objective of liber-
ating the Congolese people from the yoke of an authoritarian regime’.117 
As many groups believe that the nation state consists exclusively of 
autochthonous peoples, there is no contradiction for them between 
autochthony-based and universalist discourses. Similarly, armed groups 
may profess to be against the government due to its supposed foreign 
infiltration.118
113 Stephen Jackson, ‘Sons of which soil? The language and politics of autochthony in 
eastern D.R. Congo’, African Studies Review 49/2 (2006).
114 Verweijen, ‘From autochthony to violence?’; Judith Verweijen and Koen Vlassenroot, 
‘Armed mobilisation and the nexus of territory, identity, and authority: the contested 
territorial aspirations of the Banyamulenge in eastern Congo’, Journal of Contemporary 
African Studies 33/2 (2015).
115 PARC is the political branch of the Forces Armées Allejula (FAAL, Alleluja Armed 
Forces), also known as the Mai-Mai Yakotumba.
116 Interview with Raphael Looba Undji, outskirts of Sebele, 16 December 2011.
117 Coalition des congolais pour la libération–Force de libération du Congo, ‘Cahier de charge’.
118 Hoffmann and Verweijen, ‘Strategic Reversibility’. 
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The fact that armed groups are closely associated with specific ethnic 
constituencies whose rights they claim to defend, does not, however, 
preclude them from seeking the transformation of the social-political 
order as a whole. At the same time, visions for change remain firmly 
anchored in the framework of the classic nation state model. Most armed 
groups demand access to the state apparatus and call for improved 
state governance, in particular public service provision. Their struggle 
is, therefore, for inclusion in the current state-dominated order (along 
with the exclusion of those they define as foreigners) rather than for the 
complete overhaul of that order. 
Although armed groups demand changes to the current political 
settlement, they do so within the existing parameters of the nation state 
and its formal political institutions. Due to their links to state actors 
and elites, who often derive part of their power from their ability to 
mobilize force, armed groups also contribute—perhaps unwittingly—to 
the reproduction of the current state-dominated order. As a consequence, 
and regardless the intentions and strength of individual armed groups, 
their collective and cumulative presence precludes substantial changes 
in the social-political order. The militarization of that order, which both 
ensures and is an outcome of the influence of armed groups, has become 
an almost self-perpetuating process. 
The perpetuation of militarization 
The continuing proliferation of armed groups in the eastern Congo is 
fostered by the multi-faceted links between armed and non-armed actors. 
Civilians do not maintain these links only for personal gain but also 
in the quest for security and protection. Moreover, those who do not 
have the protection of armed actors are at a disadvantage compared to 
those who do. Other factors driving collaboration with armed groups 
are its normalization, which as a result has come to provoke little moral 
censure;119 as well as profound discontent with the current social-political 
119 For examples, see: Judith Verweijen, ‘Military business and the business of the 
military’, Review of African Political Economy 40/135 (2013).
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order and the government. This discontent, in turn, partly stems from 
the counterproductive policies adopted by Kinshasa to deal with insta-
bility in the east. 
Offer and demand for protection
An important way in which armed groups and civilians are linked is via 
protection mechanisms, which may also link civilians to commanders of 
the regular army.120 The word ‘protection’ should be understood here in 
a wider sense, encompassing not only Mafia-like protection rackets that 
provide physical protection against insecurity (sometimes caused by the 
organization itself), but also other practices. These can take the form of 
pressuring state services to obtain certain advantages for their clients, 
such as influencing the department of land affairs to grant them a plot, 
or asking the territorial administration to appoint them or relatives to 
a particular position or to award them contracts.121 Services provided 
in the framework of protection also include debt collection from third 
parties, and shielding illegal activities such as drug trafficking, banditry 
and smuggling.
Similar again to Mafia-like organizations, the forms of protection 
provided by political-military entrepreneurs in the eastern Congo cover a 
wide spectrum, from coercion to persuasion. In some cases, armed groups 
run protection rackets purely based on coercion, attacking and harassing 
those who do not comply. In other contexts, people solicit protection 
themselves. One reason for this is that such protection compensates for 
the absence of strong, effective, accessible and accountable state institu-
tions and security services.122
Both elites and non-elites in the east are subject to ongoing physical, 
political and socio-economic insecurity. Insecurity has many different 
sources, such as poverty, the weak enforcement of property rights, 
120 The relevance of protection mechanisms in the context of the eastern Congo has 
been extensively analyzed in Raeymaekers, Violent Capitalism.
121 Raeymaekers, Violent Capitalism; Verweijen, ‘Ambiguity of Militarization’.
122 Verweijen, ‘Military business’.
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predatory and unpredictable state services, rampant banditry and routine 
armed group activity. Moreover, conflicts abound, whether at the inter-
personal, interfamilial, community or inter-community level. These 
conflicts can be variously related to land and its use,123 debt, theft, family 
matters such as inheritance, intercommunity tensions and past violence 
or crime. They may also be related to public authority, including succes-
sion disputes between customary chiefs, conflicts between customary 
and political-administrative authorities, and disputes surrounding the 
status and boundaries of administrative entities. These multiple sources 
of insecurity, and the deficiencies of the formal mechanisms that are 
designed to address them, create a demand for protection, in particular 
from powerful patrons who are able to wield force and exercise influ-
ence on state agencies.124 The existence of these protection mechanisms, 
however, further perpetuates insecurity, since they lead to threats and 
violence. 
Collective action problems and normalization
Due to the weaknesses of civilian and state-led mechanisms of gover-
nance, those who do not solicit the help of armed protectors, or try to 
resist imposed protection, tend to be at a disadvantage compared to those 
who comply and collaborate with armed actors. Electoral candidates 
might be unable to campaign in their constituency if they do not endorse 
the armed group operating there, to the advantage of politicians who do. 
Similarly, shopkeepers refusing armed group protection may see their 
goods looted and delivery convoys attacked, while competitors profit-
ably operate without such problems. Parties to intercommunal disputes, 
fearing recourse to violence, may also seek armed groups’ protection for 
reasons of self-defence.
123 Koen Vlassenroot and Gillian Mathys, ‘“It’s not all about the land”. Land disputes 
and conflict in the eastern Congo’, PSRP Briefing Paper 14, London: Rift Valley Institute, 
forthcoming 2016.
124 Raeymaekers, Violent Capitalism; See also: Verweijen, ‘Ambiguity of Militarization’.
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Since not collaborating and complying with armed groups can put 
people at a serious disadvantage with their competitors, there are 
limited incentives to stop such collaboration or to refuse the demands 
of armed groups.125 The situation would be quite different if, despite the 
risks involved, people were to decide collectively not to collaborate or 
comply with armed groups. The overall risks of resisting would then also 
diminish, since armed groups would lack civilian collaborators who spy 
on others in order to provide information about who is against them. 
Armed groups would not then, be able to play off opposing factions 
and groups against each other, as is presently the case—a strategy that 
provides them with much influence.
Collaborating and complying with armed actors, however, has become 
normalized through the Congo’s long history of militarization, starting 
even before the onset of the First Congo War in 1996. Normalization 
lowers the threshold to solicit protection from armed actors or to resist 
it when it is imposed. Even if it is perceived as unjust, when it becomes 
inscribed in daily routines, the payment of protection fees elicits little 
resistance. For instance, while villagers may regret the impact on their 
livelihoods, the weekly donation of cassava flour per household to 
support armed groups provokes less contestation after the practice has 
continued for an extended period.126 
The normalization of protection is also evident among politicians, 
businesspeople and state authorities, who routinely use armed groups to 
further their ends. Normalization is further encouraged by impunity. It 
is relatively rare that politicians or businesspeople are held accountable 
for supporting armed groups. Moreover, impunity was institutional-
ized during the transition, when political-military entrepreneurs were 
integrated into the state system without any form of vetting.127 Impunity at 
125 Maria Eriksson Baaz and Judith Verweijen, ‘Arbiters with guns: The ambiguity of 
military involvement in civilian disputes in the DR Congo’, Third World Quarterly 35/5 
(2014). 
126 Verweijen, ‘Ambiguity of Militarization’.
127 Laura Davis, ‘Power shared and justice shelved: the Democratic Republic of Congo’, 
The International Journal of Human Rights 17/2 (2013).
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the top has seemingly inspired those at lower levels of the social-political 
order to follow suit. Since the end of the transition, harnessing violence 
for political and economic gain is a practice that is increasingly applied by 
lower-level leaders, who play a limited role in national politics.128 These 
leaders include customary chiefs, members of provincial parliaments, 
territorial administrators and businesspeople with provincial rather than 
national business networks. This democratization of militarized politics 
is both a cause and a result of the fragmented armed group landscape. 
Smaller-scale armed groups are easier to approach and mobilize for local 
elites: The more of such groups that operate, the easier it becomes for 
elites to solicit them.
Multi-faceted discontent with the social-political order
Congolese and international policymakers and media alike tend to portray 
present-day armed group mobilization in the east as criminal rather 
than political in nature. Armed groups are understood to no longer have 
any political visions or agendas, and are seen instead as predominantly 
motivated by material self-interests. The evidence for this reading is 
found in the groups’ regular engagement in banditry, such as ambushes 
and robberies, and in illegal economic activities, including smuggling 
and illegal forms of exploiting natural resources.129 For many individuals, 
however, being in an armed group is not merely a way to access financial 
benefits. Membership offers them a professional and social position, 
leads to new forms of loyalty and social belonging, and gives them the 
idea of being engaged in meaningful social activity.130
128 Verweijen and Iguma Wakenge, ‘Understanding armed group proliferation’.
129 For example, see: UNEP–MONUSCO–OSESG, ‘Experts’ Background Report on 
Illegal Exploitation and Trade in Natural Resources Benefitting Organized Criminal 
Groups and Recommendations on MONUSCO’s Role in Fostering Stability and Peace in 
Eastern DR Congo’, 15 April 2015. 
130 Luca Jourdan, ‘Being at war, being young: violence and youth in North Kivu’, in 
Conflict and Social Transformation in Eastern DR Congo, eds. Koen Vlassenroot and Timothy 
Raeymaekers, Ghent: Conflict Research Group and Academia Press, 2004.
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Many armed group members continue to be inspired by ideas and 
views of a political nature, even though these may not be coherently 
articulated. When asked why they fight, they often answer with polit-
ically-coloured discourse, emphasizing the need for self-defence in 
response to continuing ‘foreign threats’ or the weaknesses of government 
security forces.131 The discourse of autochthony also articulates broader 
discontent with the government and the current social-political order as 
a whole. It leads to the idea that the current government is irresponsible 
and biased against their group because it is a puppet of foreign powers 
such as Rwanda. In their cahier des charges of February 2011, PARC–FAAL 
lists 11 grievances against the government, including:
‘3.  The signing by the government of agreements with neighbouring 
countries for the massive entry of foreign populations, without 
consultation of the national assembly, as if it were a conquered land
4.  Consideration of foreign troops in the FARDC instead of Congo-
lese troops (…)
6.  Leaving the borders under the control of foreign troops to facilitate 
their massive entry into the country (the DRC)
7.  The Congolese intelligence services are henceforth under the 
control of the well-oiled machine of Kigali’132
Even though they are often linked to self-interested demands, such 
as access to positions in the state apparatus, these politically charged 
discourses do not appear to be mere pretexts. The consistency and inten-
sity with which political ideas are evoked across armed groups cannot 
be discounted as inspiring people to take up arms. These political ideas 
also explain why some armed groups have a degree of popular support. 
Many people share the belief that self-defence is necessary to guarantee 
the survival of their community against putative foreign threats. They 
131 Verweijen, ‘From autochthony to violence’.
132 Mai Mai reformé, Groupe alleluia–Yakotumba, ‘Notre cahier de charge adressée à son 
excellence monsieur le Président de la République et Chef de l’Etat de la République 
Démocratique du Congo à Kinshasa’, 5 February 2011, unpublished document, on file 
with the Rift Valley Institute.
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likewise feel abandoned by the current government, living in permanent 
insecurity, including that perpetuated by government security forces. 
Opposition to the current government is an important driver of 
support to armed groups, and reinforces the impact that political devel-
opments at the national level may have on armed mobilization in the 
east. The increasing authoritarian tendencies of the government may 
nourish further discontent and therefore reinforce support for armed 
groups, even though in recent years non-violent protest movements such 
as Lutte pour le changement (LUCHA, Struggle for Change) have become an 
alternative channel for efforts at regime change.133 Accordingly, any delays 
or manipulation of the planned elections that allow the incumbent presi-
dent to stay in power longer than mandated may increase the mobilizing 
potential of armed groups. In a declaration issued in June 2016, the Conseil 
national pour la libération–Force d’autodéfense populaire (CNL–FAP, National 
Liberation Council–Popular Self-Defence Force), based in the Ruzizi 
Plain in Uvira, recommends that the Congolese government ‘respect the 
country’s constitution, to allow for organizing and holding presidential 
elections on the foreseen date’.134
Counterproductive policies
The presidential circle has prioritized low-cost solutions to address 
armed group activity and concentrated its efforts on groups constituting a 
direct menace to its power or which have wider geopolitical significance. 
Three main policy responses have been applied in varying combinations 
over time: first, the integration of armed groups into the national armed 
forces; second, military operations; and third, disarmament, demobi-
lization and reintegration (DDR) programmes; following three broad 
phases: 2006–2009, 2009–2012 and 2012–present.
133 For example, see: Marta Iñiguez de Heredia, ‘LUCHA: Youth movement in Congo 
demands social justice’, Pambazuka, 30 October 2014. LUCHA is a youth movement 
founded in Goma, North Kivu, in June 2012.
134 Conseil national pour la libération–Force d’autodéfense populaire. Coordination, ‘Declaration 
du CNL–FAP sur l’insécurité et l’aggression en cours en République Démocratique du 
Congo’, 10 June 2016, unpublished document, on file with the Rift Valley Institute.
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The first post-transition years saw the army integration process in 
full swing. Although integrated command structures of the new army 
had been created at the start of the transition in 2003–2004, troops 
were only gradually mixed and integrated, with the last integrated 
brigade (the 18th) finally completing its mixing process and training (or 
brassage) in 2008. Leaders of armed groups who had participated in the 
Second Congo War but who refused army integration were thought to be 
simply unhappy with the process of brassage. It was only after the 2006 
elections that several of these factions, such as the Mai-Mai Yakutumba, 
declared themselves as anti-government armed groups and not merely 
as anti-brassage. The government still believed that negotiating with the 
dissident leaders and offering them more favourable terms would suffice 
to convince them to integrate.135 
There were other factors that informed this policy. The fact that 
the newly formed army was neither operationally strong nor very 
reliable—riddled as it was with divided loyalties and parallel command 
chains—precluded effective military action against particular armed 
groups. During the course of 2007 and 2008, scarce military resources 
were channelled towards the fight against the biggest political and military 
threat, the CNDP. Other Congolese armed groups were rarely targeted by 
military operations because negotiation was still the preferred strategy.136 
This policy culminated in the 2008 Amani Conference in Goma, which 
brought together all of the Congolese armed groups operating in the 
Kivus, as well as representatives from the communities from which these 
groups emerged. This initiative allowed participants to present their 
grievances, and promised army integration and DDR packages to armed 
group leaders. So attractive were the rewards of participation, including 
the promise of ranks and positions in the army, along with enhanced 
political representation, that it stimulated a further proliferation of 
135 Stearns, Verweijen and Eriksson Baaz, ‘The National Army and Armed Groups’. 
136 Eriksson Baaz and Verweijen, ‘Volatility of a half-cooked bouillabaisse’.
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armed groups.137 The rise in armed groups, however, should also be 
seen against the government’s informal policy of promoting the partici-
pation of as many groups as possible to weaken the influence of the 
all-dominant CNDP.138 
The integration of the CNDP and a number of other armed groups 
into the FARDC at the start of 2009—following a surprise rapproche-
ment between Kinshasa and Kigali—gave rise to a new policy phase 
that emphasized military operations. New operational structures were 
created in the FARDC and Kivus-wide offensives were launched against 
a wide variety of armed groups. Some of these groups, which had previ-
ously coexisted with the FARDC in a more or less peaceful manner, faced 
serious military pressure for the first time.139 
Aside from disastrous humanitarian consequences, the Kimia II and 
Amani Leo140 operations had other counterproductive effects, despite 
managing to weaken some groups such as the FDLR. What explains these 
limited results is that the operations were geared more towards incor-
porating the CNDP into the FARDC than towards effectively addressing 
armed groups. The operations were further plagued by logistical problems, 
weak command and control, and limited strategic planning. There was 
also little attention to the political and economic dimensions of the wider 
conflict dynamics. Worse still, there was significant collateral damage, in 
particular human rights violations and property destruction, which made 
people reluctant to collaborate with the FARDC.
In areas where Mai-Mai groups that drew on anti-Rwandophone 
discourses saw brutal operations by army units dominated by Rwandophone 
137 Koen Vlassenroot and Timothy Raeymaekers, ‘Kivu’s intractable security 
conundrum’, African Affairs 108/432 (2009).
138 Stearns, Verweijen and Eriksson Baaz, ‘The National Army and Armed Groups’.
139 Stearns et al., ‘Mai-Mai Yakutumba’.
140 Kimia (‘Silence’ or ‘Quiet’ in Swahili) II is the name for Kivus-wide military 
operations that were conducted between March and December 2009. Amani Leo (‘Peace 
Today’ in Swahili) refers to a series of military operations conducted between January 
2010 and April 2012.
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ex-CNDP soldiers, the Mai-Mai’s popular support was reinforced.141 In 
other areas, large armed groups such as the FDLR were displaced but the 
FARDC did not permanently occupy the vacated area. This allowed armed 
groups to return and conduct retaliatory attacks on the population, which 
they accused of siding with the FARDC.142 In response, local self-defence 
forces and smaller-scale armed groups emerged to protect civilians from 
such retaliation. In many cases, these new armed groups were initiated 
by FARDC officers deserting from the army. This process intensified 
during the course of an army restructuring process in 2011, which caused 
many FARDC units to be withdrawn from the field. The restructuring 
also reinforced discontent among FARDC officers with their current rank 
and position, nourishing the idea that particular communities, notably 
Rwandophones, were unduly privileged in the army. The consequence was 
another wave of desertion.143 In sum, the military operations conducted 
between 2009–2012 stimulated, rather than mitigated, armed mobiliza-
tion, leading to the emergence of new, smaller armed groups.
The birth of the M23 rebellion in 2012, formed by ex-CNDP soldiers 
and officers who had deserted, heralded another phase in policies towards 
armed groups. The M23’s creation was a direct result of the problem-
atic 2009 integration of the CNDP into the FARDC, and fully exposed 
the limitations of army integration. The government was unwilling to 
once again integrate ex-CNDP officers and soldiers into the army and 
formally abandoned the policy of collective, negotiated army integration 
during 2012. Now, while members of armed groups wishing to lay down 
their arms do still have the option to join the FARDC, their integration 
141 International Crisis Group, ‘No Stability in Kivu’; Eriksson Baaz and Verweijen, 
‘Volatility of a half-cooked bouillabaisse’.
142 Ellie Kemp and Martin Hartberg, ‘Waking the devil. The impact of forced 
disarmament on civilians in the Kivus’, Oxford: Oxfam GB for Oxfam International, July 
2009; Human Rights Watch, ‘“You Will Be Punished.” Attacks on Civilians in Eastern 
Congo’, New York: Human Rights Watch, 2009.
143 Stearns et al. ‘Raia Mutomboki. The Flawed Peace Process in the DRC and the Birth 
of an Armed Franchise’, Usalama Project, London: Rift Valley Institute, 2013. 
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occurs on an individual basis and after training at military bases outside 
the Kivus. 
Individual combatants can also join the newly minted DDR programme, 
operational since late 2015 but facing many difficulties.144 The army is 
engaged in a confusing mixture of military operations and awareness 
raising for the DDR programme, simultaneously trying to coerce and 
persuade armed groups to lay down their arms. The resulting distrust 
towards DDR initiatives is compounded by the growing number of 
armed group leaders deliberately killed by the army, which makes armed 
group leaders reluctant to respond to the FARDC’s calls for negotia-
tions. The programme is further undermined by poor living conditions in 
DDR camps, and demobilized combatants’ limited livelihood prospects 
(reintegration programmes have been slow to materialize).
Overall, the efforts of the government to deal with armed groups in the 
east have not only had limited effects but they also seem to have stimu-
lated armed mobilization. They have created skewed incentive structures 
and aggravated local conflict dynamics. The ensuing insecurity drives 
a demand for protection that reinforces the position of armed groups, 
who then hamper the functioning and further development of the very 
civilian and state-led mechanisms and institutions that could provide 
security. Another vicious cycle relates to the interplay between, on the 
one hand, dislike for the current social-political order, and on the other 
hand, Kinshasa’s policies towards armed groups, which only reinforce 
this discontent. For both the Congolese government and its international 
supporters, the overall negative effects of previous policies raise questions 
about what more effective measures could look like and how they might 
be implemented without generating unintended consequences. 
144 Christoph Vogel and Josaphat Musamba, ‘Recycling rebels? Demobilization in the 
Congo’, PSRP Briefing Paper 11, London: Rift Valley Institute, March 2016.
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5. Conclusions and policy considerations 
The eastern Congo has been mired in ongoing violent conflict for more 
than two decades. The adoption of a peace accord in 2003, which intro-
duced a new political settlement at the national level, has not prevented 
armed groups from continuing to play a crucial role in sub-national 
political settlements in the east. Initially, the ongoing violence in the 
east was closely related to the competition for power in the national 
political arena. Ex-belligerents sought to carve out spheres of influence 
in state institutions under a power-sharing agreement. After the general 
elections that ended the transition period in 2006, however, the link 
between the role of armed groups in sub-national political settlements 
in the east and the national political settlement weakened, with the 
exception of groups linked to regional elite networks, such as the CNDP.
Yet, the national political settlement continues to shape the presence 
and influence of armed groups in the east. Power has gradually become 
concentrated in the president and his entourage, who are primarily 
interested in ensuring their own survival, and not in strengthening the 
institutions of state. The presidential circle has reproduced patterns of 
selective governance that go back to the colonial era, taking only limited 
interest in areas and issues that are not critical to its hold on power. 
Consequently, while investing significant resources in addressing armed 
groups that pose a direct threat to its power, notably those backed by 
neighbours, it has undertaken limited initiatives to control smaller-scale 
armed groups operating in remote rural areas. It is the latter type of 
armed group that currently prevails. 
The presidential circle has generally preferred low-cost options—
whether facing large or small armed groups—such as co-optation via army 
integration or military operations with limited means. These initiatives 
have been largely counterproductive, and feed further discontent with 
the current social-political order and the government. Military opera-
tions have deepened insecurity and led to the emergence of smaller-scale 
armed groups. Co-opting political-military entrepreneurs has encouraged 
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impunity for violence and abuses of power, inspired lower-level and 
second-tier leaders to engage in political-military entrepreneurialism, 
and created antagonism among leaders and groups not receiving equally 
favourable treatment. Both political and armed mobilization continue to 
have salient ethno-regional dimensions. Decisions to include particular 
leaders and groups therefore often lead to perceptions of exclusion and 
discrimination among others. 
For the same reason, the increasingly exclusionary character of the 
national political settlement has fostered profound discontent. The 
presidential advisors and other key figures that make up President 
Joseph Kabila’s inner circle are identified with a particular and limited 
set of the Congo’s regions. Factions from the other parts of the country 
feel excluded, especially since the political bodies in which they are 
represented (including the government) have limited influence when 
compared to the presidential circle. The dwindling legitimacy of the 
current power holders creates a dangerous situation. It may invite those 
who seek a different social-political order to throw their weight behind 
armed groups, especially when peaceful means to channel political 
competition are restricted.
While armed groups capitalize on discontent with the current social-
political order, it seems doubtful these groups—especially the present 
myriad of small-scale groups—could profoundly change that order, even 
at the local level. Although some of these groups present themselves 
and are partly seen as governance actors with a measure of legitimacy, 
this role is often based on perceptions that they defend specific ethnic 
communities, which fuel inter-community conflict. Regardless of their 
own behaviour towards civilian populations, the very presence of armed 
groups creates insecurity because it leads to armed confrontations with 
the government security forces and other armed groups. Many groups 
do, in fact, engage in predatory and abusive practices towards civilians, 
and are therefore also a direct source of insecurity. 
The current constellation of armed groups is not transformative. Not 
only do their own practices and discourses strongly resemble those of 
Congolese state agents (notably the armed forces) but they primarily 
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seek inclusion in the state apparatus and political settlement and not 
a profound overhaul of the social-political order. Furthermore, because 
these groups are embedded in multi-layered social networks that straddle 
state and non-state spheres, their very presence contributes to the repro-
duction of the current state-dominated order. Numerous state actors 
who have vested interests in the current order derive their own power in 
part from liaising with non-state armed groups. This raises the question 
to what extent formally integrating these groups into the political settle-
ment would contribute to stabilization. 
Inclusion or exclusion
The premise of the power-sharing agreement that formally ended the 
Second Congo War in 2003 was that integrating armed groups and their 
wider networks into state institutions would entice them to permanently 
demobilize. This did not happen in the eastern Congo for a complex 
set of reasons, one of which was the question of representation. Many 
of the armed groups had weak internal cohesion and nascent political 
structures, which prevented the political and military leadership from 
fully enjoying the support of all mid-level commanders and the rank 
and file.145 Similarly, the civilian communities from which armed groups 
drew members and support often did not believe these groups were 
representing their interests at the negotiating table or in state institu-
tions. Integrating these groups therefore did little to address community 
grievances or solve local conflicts. 
The questions of inclusion and representation continue to be relevant. 
It cannot be assumed that armed groups are representative of the 
communities from which they are recruited, or that they necessarily 
voice their legitimate grievances. Not only have many armed groups 
imposed themselves on and committed violence against the very commu-
nities they claim to protect and represent, they also tend to inflate and 
manipulate the grievances expressed by these communities to their own 
145 Stearns, Verweijen and Eriksson Baaz, ‘The National Army and Armed Groups’.
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ends.146 An analysis of the cahiers des charges that armed groups issue 
suggests that many of the political demands presented as conditions for 
demobilization cannot be implemented. Some armed group demands 
are xenophobic and discriminatory. Mai-Mai groups have, for example, 
demanded the removal of all Rwandophone army personnel from their 
areas. Implementing this would set a dangerous precedent for ethnic 
segregation within the army.
Another impractical demand—especially from small armed groups—is 
the recognition of their political branch as a political party. Registration 
as a political party in the Congo requires evidence of membership in all 
of the country’s provinces, which is politically and financially impossible 
to achieve for the majority of smaller groups. There are, in any case, 
already hundreds of political parties: 417 had registered at the time of the 
2011 elections.147 The existence of so many parties has contributed to the 
fragmentation of the political landscape, including the opposition. This 
hampers the transformation of the current order, as no faction is suffi-
ciently powerful to counterbalance the presidential patronage network 
or push through reforms. 
Demands for better infrastructure and public services in their area 
of origins, such as roads, healthcare structures and access to water also 
figure prominently in the cahiers des charges issued by armed groups. It 
is unlikely, however, that the government would commit funds to such 
efforts, given the current situation of selective governance and limited 
state revenues. Honouring such demands—in a context of rampant and 
pervasive poverty—risks incentivizing rural populations to support the 
mobilization of armed groups to receive development, such as roads, 
hospitals and electricity, in their area. 
The recognition of armed groups as political rather than criminal 
actors does not necessarily imply that including them in state institu-
tions and responding to their demands is the right solution for their 
demobilization. Armed groups and their political representatives should 
146 Eriksson Baaz and Verweijen, ‘Volatility of a half-cooked bouillabaisse’.
147 The Carter Center, ‘Presidential and Legislative Elections’.
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perhaps be excluded rather than included in decision-making processes 
and non-violent actors rewarded and recognized instead. Empowering 
peaceful actors could help end entrenched impunity, and could offer an 
alternative to the cycle of insecurity-generating protection mechanisms 
to overcome insecurity. Civilian inclusion may also encourage currently 
inhibited collective civilian resistance to armed actors.
Long term or short term 
While desirable in the long term, empowering civilian leaders in the 
short term is difficult—how would they withstand the threats and intimi-
dations of armed actors? A similar dilemma arises in relation to other 
aspects of demilitarization. Addressing the underlying causes of armed 
mobilization requires multi-pronged efforts that focus on issues such as 
reducing physical and socio-economic insecurity, strengthening civilian 
governance mechanisms and resolving local conflicts around territory, 
local authority and identity. Such efforts, however, will do little to disarm 
existing armed groups, which still requires direct engagement with those 
groups. 
The very presence of armed groups can hinder initiatives to promote 
stabilization. A good example is programmes aimed at dealing with local 
conflicts. Although conflicts can be defused via reconciliation efforts and 
conflict resolution mechanisms, such as local peace committees, ongoing 
armed group activity may undermine these initiatives and reignite 
conflict dynamics. Armed groups may prevent the implementation of 
an agreed settlement or sow division by giving the impression that they 
committed acts of violence on behalf of one of the parties to a conflict. 
At the same time, a sole focus on demobilizing existing armed groups 
without addressing the longer-term drivers of armed mobilization is 
not sustainable. Demobilized armed groups will simply be replaced by 
others. Long-term drivers of conflict are also affected by the nature of 
the national political settlement. While an exclusive political settlement 
dominated by a presidential patronage network with a limited regional 
base and authoritarian tendencies may be relatively stable, lessons from 
the Mobutu regime and the current Kabila regime show that these 
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political orders carry the seeds of future instability. Indeed, the current 
national political settlement has served to entrench instability in one 
part of the country, and the presidential patronage network has shown 
limited interest in ending armed group activity and addressing other 
drivers of instability.
The presidential circle’s limited incentives to reduce instability in the 
east pose a dilemma to international donors. The programmes the latter 
design to address the direct and indirect drivers of armed mobilization 
and conflict dynamics may ultimately further reduce these incentives. The 
aid industry in the eastern Congo has long been a resource for the presi-
dential circle and its wider networks, which draw on it for the purposes 
of patronage. At the same time, the influx of foreign aid partly absolves 
the government from the need to invest more in public service provi-
sion in the east. Lessons from other areas of protracted violent conflict 
demonstrate that donors are not external, but integral, to the political 
settlements they help fund and facilitate.148 International donor interven-
tions aimed at stabilization that do not reflect on their own impact on 
the political settlement—most notably how these programmes affect 
elite incentive structures—are unlikely to produce the desired effects. 
Carrots or sticks 
The choice to either entice political-military entrepreneurs to demobilize 
by granting them impunity and other benefits, or to pressurize them 
through military operations and prosecutions is a difficult one—until 
now, both approaches have had limited effects. One reason is that the 
workings of the Congolese state apparatus often lead to the inadequate 
implementation of these measures. A good example is the nature of the 
judiciary. While on paper, prosecutions of political-military entrepre-
neurs seem to be a good idea, the current state of the Congo’s judicial 
system might undermine the possible beneficial effects. The govern-
ment is likely to use accusations of political support to armed groups to 
148 Tobias Hagmann, ‘Stabilization, Extraversion and Political Settlements in Somalia’, 
PSRP, London: Rift Valley Institute, 2016.
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crack down on opposition figures, as has already occurred in the past.149 
Because of this context, any measures that are proposed must always be 
assessed in light of the current political settlement and how the nature 
of this settlement will affect implementation.
Circumventing the state apparatus, dominated by interests vested in 
the current order, could help avoid some of these difficulties. Excluding 
state actors, however, is both dangerous and could undermine the 
sustainability of initiatives. Their exclusion reduces the possibilities 
for transforming the nature of governance in the long term, which is an 
important factor sustaining instability in the east. Exclusion and punitive 
measures, such as sanctions, can also render government actors increas-
ingly hostile and drive them to take more intransigent positions.
The question of persuasion and punishment, and how to balance these, 
also applies to political-military entrepreneurs. While punishment or 
pressure can sometimes be effective, merely chastising political-military 
entrepreneurs risks further isolating and radicalizing them. Behavioural 
change can also be achieved through constructive dialogue and positive 
incentives, such as community appreciation and spiritual leaders’ encour-
agement. The current climate of profiteering and impunity, however, 
does not bode well for dialogue and positive incentives. The problem 
of armed mobilization in the eastern Congo is so complex and deeply 
engrained that only a variety of initiatives and policies—both carrots and 
sticks, bottom-up and top-down approaches, and short and long-term 
measures—is likely to trigger any lasting change. Getting that balance 
right should be based on careful analysis of political settlements, both 
at the national level and at sub-national levels in the east, and how they 
interrelate.
149 An example is the arrest in 2012 of Dieudonné Bakungu Mithondeke, an opposition 
politician in North Kivu who was accused of maintaining links to an armed group. See: 
‘RDC: quatre morts lors de l’arrestation du député d’opposition Dieudonné Bakungu’, 
Malijet, 3 February 2012. 
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Glossary of acronyms, words and phrases
AFDL Alliances des forces démocratiques pour la libération du 
Congo–Zaïre (Alliance of Democratic Forces for the 
Liberation of Congo–Zaire)
Amani Leo ‘Peace Today’ in Swahili, name for Kivus-wide 
military operations against armed groups held 
between January 2010 and April 2012
brassage process of mixing fighters of different former 
warring factions into integrated units
cahier des charges  list of political demands from an armed group
CCL Coalition des congolais pour la libération (Coalition of 
Congolese for Liberation)
CNDP Congrès national pour la défense du peuple (National 
Congress for the Defence of the People)
CNL–FAP Conseil national pour la libération–Force d’autodéfense 
populaire (National Liberation Council–Popular Self-
Defence Force)
DDR disarmament, demobilization and reintegration
FARDC Forces armées de la République démocratique du Congo 
(Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo)
FDLR Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda 
(Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda)
GDP gross domestic product 
Gécamines Société genérale des carrières et des mines (General 
Society of  Quarries and Mines)
Kimia II ‘Silence/Quiet’ in Swahili, name for Kivus-wide 
military operations against armed groups held 
between March-December 2009
Lingalaphones Lingala-speaking people
LUCHA Lutte pour le changement (Struggle for Change)
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M23 Mouvement du 23 mars (March 23 Movement)
MONUSCO Mission de l’Organisation des Nations Unies pour la 
stabilisation en République démocratique du Congo 
(United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission 
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo)
NDC Nduma Defence of Congo
NGO non-governmental organization
PARC–FAAL Parti pour l’ action et la reconstruction du Congo–
Forces armées alleluja (Party for Action and the 
Reconstruction of Congo–Alleluja Armed Forces)
PPRD Parti du peuple pour la reconstruction et la démocratie 
(People’s Party for Reconstruction and Democracy)
rapportage ‘returning’, system of channelling resources 
extracted from citizens to higher echelons of state 
agencies
RCD Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie (Congolese 
Rally for Democracy)
RCD/K–ML Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie/Kisangani–
Mouvement de libération (Congolese Rally for 
Democracy/Kisangani–Liberation Movement)
RUD-Urunana Ralliement pour l’unité et la démocratie (RUD, Rally for 
Unity and Democracy)–Urunana
Rwandophones Kinyarwanda-speaking people
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